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TEXAS GULF SULPHUR; REFORM IN THE
SECURITIES MARKETPLACE
GILBERT SANDLER* AND ALLAN F. CONWILLf
On August 13, 1968, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit handed down, after some seventeen months of delib-
eration involving all nine members of one of the most sophisticated
corporate law tribunals in the country, a decision destined from its
very inception to become the landmark case in the regulation of se-
curities transactions and corporate disclosure. The result in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.' surprised few informed members of the
securities industry or their counsel, but the vast implications of the
opinion stunned the professional investment community by rudely
reawakening them to the impropriety of the long-established practice
of profiting, and enabling others to profit, from advance knowledge
of material information affecting the market price of securities. The
purpose of this article is to review the express and implied teachings
of the decision, its apparently intended and actual effect on the in-
vestment community, and its proper application to factual situations
not presented in Texas Gulf.
I. Ti DECISION
A. The Factual Setting
The background of the case has been succinctly developed in
the opinions of both the Second Circuit2 and of the District Cour
as well as in more narrative contexts. 4 For present purposes, it will
suffice to summarize some of the pertinent events and to make more
specific references in the course of subsequent discussion.
In November 1963, Texas Gulf Sulphur (hereinafter referred
to as TGS) commenced exploratory drilling on the "Kidd" segment
of an undeveloped parcel of land near Timmins, Ontario, in which,
* Member of the New York Bar; A.B. Rutgers University, 1963; LL.B. Columbia
Law School 1966.
t Member of the New York Bar; BS. Northwestern University, 1943; J.D. North-
western Law School 1949; Lecturer at Law, Columbia Law School.
1 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub. nom. Coates v. SEC, 37 U.S.L.W.
3395 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1969); Kline v. SEC, 37 US.L.W. 3395 (US. Apr. 22, 1969), as to
these petitioners.
2 Id.
3 258 F. Supp. 262, 267-75, 281-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
4 See, e.g., Brooks, Annals of Finance: A Reasonable Amount of Time, ThE NEI
YoRKER, Nov. 8, 1968, at 160-88, for a particularly entertaining description of the
events in question.
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according to previous geological examination, there were large and
contiguous "anomalies" or areas of potential mineralization. A first
drill core was extracted and was visually evaluated as remarkably rich
in copper, zinc and silver. Immediately thereafter, this drill core was
sent to the United States for a more accurate chemical assay, tight
security measures were imposed on the drill site, and negotiations
were begun for the acquisition by TGS of other portions of the Kidd
property not yet owned by it. Simultaneously with these preparations,
several TGS officers or employees who knew about this first drill core
began purchasing TGS stock at prices ranging from 175/8 to 181/.
Early in December, the chemical assay confirmed TGS's most opti-
mistic expectations concerning the initial core and these same and
other informed TGS personnel (and certain of their relatives and
associates) purchased large quantities of TGS stock and short-term
calls thereon at slightly higher prices. These purchases continued
through the acquisition of the Kidd parcel on March 27, 1964, and
the resumption of drilling on the site on March 81 until April 8, 1964.
By that date, three drill holes had established substantial miner-
alization of virtually the same quality as the first hole on the eastern
perimeter of the large Kidd anomaly and additional drilling rigs
were introduced to commence drilling at westerly angles to the east
and north of the first hole. By Friday, April 10, these two holes had
encountered mineralization and rumors of a major strike were rife in
Canadian mining circles. The next morning brought many of these
rumors into American homes with the appearance of reports of TGS's
exploratory activities in major New York newspapers. TGS officials
hastily conferred and prepared a press release over the weekend.
This release, issued April 12 for dissemination on Monday, April 18,
generally denied the circulating rumors and disclosed nothing con-
cerning developments at Timmins, except that preliminary indica-
tions were favorable and warranted further exploration.
On the basis of the drilling results known to the TGS officials
who prepared the release, Securities and Exchange Commission ex-
perts later estimated an indicated TGS discovery of approximately
six to eight million tons of "proven" ore , having gross assay values
of nearly 80 dollars per ton. Continued drilling over the weekend
produced a sixth hole encountering mineralization. On the basis of
the available information, which had not, but conceivably could
have been obtained by the draftsmen of the TGS press release by
5 This estimate discounted, of course, the possibility, however unlikely, of a dis-
continuity in mineralization between the 5 holes already drilled.
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the time of its issuance, the Northern Miner, an influential Cana-
dian mining journal, announced the confirmation of a ten million
ton strike. Having found some small mineralization in two addi-
tional holes, TGS released on April 15 to the Ontario Minister of
Mines a statement reporting a twenty-five ton million strike.
Meanwhile, the April 12 release had taken its intended effect
and the market price of TGS stock declined from a high of 32,
prior to digestion of the release, to a low of 2 8 V8 on April 15. TGS
now determined to issue a complete report of its major discovery
after its scheduled board of directors meeting on April 16. Certain
officials who knew of the impending announcement ordered addi-
tional purchases of TGS stock prior to its release. Another ordered
stock for his trust accounts immeditely after the announcement but
before its appearance on the Dow Jones "broad tape," and yet
another relayed the general good tidings to a broker relative before
such appearance on the tape and purchased stock for his own ac-
count a few hours later.
The Commission alleged in its complaint that the various TGS
personnel who had purchased TGS stock and calls prior to effective
dissemination of the ore strike had exploited material inside infor-
mation in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19340 and Rule lOb-57 promulgated by the Commission there-
0 15 U.S.C. § 78 j. This provision reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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under. It was also claimed that the April 12 press release of TGS
denying the rumors of a strike was materially misleading in viola-
tion of the Rule. Furthermore, the Commission alleged that the
TGS geologist working on the drill site had improperly "tipped"
several friends, resulting in their purchases of stock and calls, and
that Rule lOb-5 had also been breached by the acceptance, in Feb-
ruary of 1964, of stock options by certain TGS officials aware of
the first remarkable Kidd drill core. An injunction restraining
future similar misconduct and compelling disgorgement of insiders'
profits was sought, the availability and assessment of damages
to numerous private plaintiffs being deferred for future resolution
after violations had been determined.
B. The District Court Decision
Judge Bonsai, sitting in the District Court, heard testimony
from the alleged insiders, TGS officials and experts, SEC experts and
various mining security specialists; the depositions of the absent TGS
geologist claimed to have "tipped" and his alleged "tippees" were
received in their absence from the trial. Relying on the supposition
that the test of whether the information concerning the first drill
core was "material" must necessarily be a conservative one" and on
the TGS experts' insistence that one or even two intersecting drill
cores did not a mine (nor earnings) make,9 Judge Bonsai held that
the insider purchases prior to the drilling of the third hole on April
910 were not based on their use or possession of information, but
rather on their "educated" guesses'1 and hopes, albeit "perhaps with
some reason."'1 Thus, insiders who had no detailed knowledge of
the drilling results3 and those who had traded only prior to April 9
were exculpated. And the court was able to avoid passing upon
8 258 F. Supp. at 280: "Material information . . . is information which, if
known, would clearly affect 'investment judgment' . . . or which directly
bears on the intrinsic value of a company's stock ... But the test of material-
ity must necessarily be a conservative one..." (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)
9 258 F. Supp. at 282-84.
10 Id. at 282. This hole established that the vertical plane of mineralization re-
vealed by the first two holes extended southward 200 feet.
11 258 F. Supp. at 284.
12 Id. at 283.
13 Huntington, a TGS attorney who knew only that TGS was quite anxious to
acquire the Kidd property was held not to have material information when he bought
TGS stock; Murray knew nothing at all of the drilling and was likewise exculpated.
258 F. Supp. at 281. Kline, who had accepted stock options with knowledge that the
first drill core was favorable, was also exonerated. Id. at 291.
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whether Darke, the geologist, had violated Rule 1Ob-5 by tipping
and whether various insiders had violated the Rule by accepting
stock options at a price which might not have reflected their then
fair market value.
Clayton and Crawford, who had purchased or ordered TGS
stock the day before the April 16 release, were held, however, then
to have been in possession of material inside information, for after
April 9, "there was real evidence that a body of commercially
mineable ore might exist.' 14 The charges against Coates and La-
mont, who had traded and passed information after the issuance of
the release but before its appearance on the broad tape and perhaps
before its digestion by the investment community, were dismissed
by reason of the court's view that insiders could act immediately
upon release of material information and without the "reasonable
waiting period" sought by the SEC.15
TGS itself was exonerated for having issued the April 12 release
denying rumors of a strike near Timmins for several reasons. First,
Judge Bonsai held that since neither TGS nor any of the draftsmen
had traded as a result of, or with the assistance of, the release, it had
not been issued "in connection with the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity" as required by the language of Rule lOb-5.1' In addition, he
found that the release was not materially misleading "on the basis
of the facts then known" to TGS draftsmen and that their exercise
of "reasonable business judgment" in the exigencies of the situa-
tion was sufficient to exculpate them..7
Needless to say, the Commission appealed from the decision of
Judge Bonsai, as did the insiders who had been held to have vio-
lated Rule 10b-5.' 8
C. The Second Circuit Decision
The cross-appeals of the Commission and the various defen-
dants were originally argued in March 1967, before a panel consist-
14 258 F. Supp. at 282.
15 Id. at 288-90.
'a Id. at 294.
17 Id. at 294-96.
18 The SEC did not appeal from Judge Bonsal's exoneration of Murray as having
no knowledge of the drilling developments or from his holding that Holyk and Mol-
lison could accept the stock options granted them since they were not members
of top management and could expect others to disclose, though the court apparently
considered the status of these defendants. See 401 F.2d at 842. In addition, the death
of Lamont while the appeal was sub judice resulted in an order dismissing the com-
plaint as to him. See id, at 842 n.6.
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ing of Judges Waterman, Moore and Hays. After nearly a year of
deliberation, the case was submitted without additional argument
to the entire court en banc, which resulted on August 13, 1968, in
a reversal of the significant portion of the District Court's opinion,
and included (1) a majority opinion 0 written by Judge Waterman,
adopted by Judges Smith and Feinberg, wholly concurred in by
Judges Kaufnan and Anderson, and partially concurred in by
Judges Friendly and Hays; (2) a concurring opinion by Judge
Friendly, adopted in part by Judges Kaufman and Anderson; (3) a
concurring and dissenting opinion by Judge Hays, and (4) a dis-
senting opinion by Judge Moore, adopted by Chief Judge Lum-
bard.
1. Insiders
The court first expanded the District Court's definition of the
class of insiders subject to Rule lOb-5. While Judge Bonsal had ob-
served that ". .. insiders... may include employees as well as offi-
cers, directors and controlling stockholders who are in possession of
material undisclosed information,... "20 Judge Waterman included
"anyone who ... has 'access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the'personal benefit of anyone'.. ." and "... anyone in possession of
material inside information .... "21 No express consideration was
given to the potential overlap of coverage by both section 16(b) and
Rule lOb-5, though the court unequivocally rejected the contention
made by defendants below that Rule lOb-5 should be applied only
to officers, directors and shareholders subject to section 16.
2. Materiality
Next, the court, though agreeing with much of Judge Bonsa's
language and citation of authority with respect to "materiality,"
undertook a major revision of his definition in its application to
the facts presented. In definitively rejecting Judge Bonsal's state-
ment that "the test of materiality must necessarily be a conservative
one" as applied to deny speculative investors Rule lOb-5 protection
as to facts of interest to them, Judge Waterman merely expanded
10 Unless otherwise indicated, the opinion of the court hereinafter referred to will
be the majority opinion of Judge Waterman.
20 258 F. Supp. at 279.
21 401 F.2d at 848.
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the class of "reasonable" investors22 by whom "materiality" is deter-
mined under the rule of List v. Fashion Park, Inc.
23
Thus, material facts include not only information disclosing the
earnings and distributions of a company but also those facts
which affect the probable future of the company and those
which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell or hold the
company's securities.24
The court did not, however, go so far as to deem material in-
formation as to the mere possibility of corporate development
which, if consummated, would be important to the hypothetical
reasonable investor. In such a case, materiality
... will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both
the indicated probability that the event will occur and the an-
ticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity.25
This balancing standard was apparently suggested as an approxima-
tion of the effect of knowledge of a particular event upon the rea-
sonable investor, in conjunction with Judge Waterman's prior state-
ment that material events
•.. are essentially extraordinary in nature and. . . are reason-
ably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of
the security if .. .disclosed.26
Applying the foregoing principles, the court held that knowl-
edge of the results of the first drill core was material because as evi-
denced by the testimony of mining stock specialists and, particularly,
by the unusual and excessive trading by insiders, even the mere
possibility of an ore strike as remarkably rich as was indicated by the
visual assay within a vast area of mineralization would have influ-
enced ". .. a reasonable, if speculative, investor. . . ."r Thus, the
insider trading from November 12, 1963, the date of extraction of
K55-1, the first drill core, until prior to effective public disclosure
by those who had express or implied28 knowledge of the extremely
22 Id. at 849.
23 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1964); cert. denied sub noma, List v. Lerner, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
24 401 F.2d at 849.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 848.
27 Id. at 850.
28 The court held Huntington had violated Rule lOb-5 though he had no detailed
knowledge of the drilling results because he had participated in the land acquisition
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favorable nature of the drilling results was found to violate Rule
lOb-5. In response to the argument that legitimate corporate objec-
tives precluded early disclosure of preliminary drilling results, the
court invoked the correlative duty, announced by the SEC in In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 29 of abstention from trading3 0
3. Tipping
Having determined that Darke, the TGS geologist, did indeed
possess material information when he told personal friends that TGS
stock "was a good buy" and that an insider's duty of abstention ex-
tends to "recommending" 3' as well as trading for one's own ac-
count, 2 the court was confronted with an incomplete record as to
what information had been passed by Darke to his alleged "tippees."
The majority 3 of the nine members of the en banc court relied on
Judge Bonsal's findings that Darke had said that TGS stock "was a
good buy" and, particularly, upon the findings below that the syn-
chronization of tippee transactions to drilling developments consti-
tuted "strong circumstantial evidence that Darke must have passed
the word to one or more of his 'tippees' that drilling... was about to
be resumed,"' 4 which, in turn, justified the inference of prior tip-
ping; accordingly, they held Darke had violated Rule lOb-5 by tip-
ping. Without considering the liability of Darke's tippees or tippees
generally, the court clearly laid the groundwork for future tippee
liability by rather bluntly stating that ". . . if they acted with actual
or constructive knowledge that the material information was un-
disclosed . . ." tippees might violate Rule lOb-5, as they were
"equally reprehensible" as their tipping source.35
program and, as evidenced by his purchase of TGS stock and, for the first time, short-
term calls, he had a "readily inferable and probably reliable understanding of the
highly favorable nature of preliminary operations." 401 F.2d at 853.
29 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
30 401 F.2d at 848, 850 n.12.
31 Id. at 848.
32 The court indicated that transactions by wives and sons-in-law of insiders were
to be treated as insider trading, rather than the results of "tips" to members of the
general public. 401 F.2d at 841 n.4, 856 n.23. Although this distinction appears insig-
nificant in Texas Gulf because the only defendants were insiders, it can become mean-
ingful if, "tippees" are ultimately held liable under Rule lOb-5, perhaps under dif-
ferent standards than insiders.
33 Judges Waterman and Anderson preferred to remand for a determination as
to ". . . whether Darke, expressly or by implication, transmitted to these outsiders
any indication of the extremely favorable results of the drilling operations .. " 401
F.2d at 852-53 n.16.
34 401 F.2d at 852.
35 Id. at 852-53.
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4. Stock Options
Although the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Bonsal's exculpa-
tion of insider optionees who were not members of "top manage-
ment," in view of its expansion of the lower court's materiality
concept, it became necessary to reverse the exoneration of "top
management" optionees38 and hold that they violated Rule lOb-5
by accepting options to purchase TGS stock at a time when the mar-
ket price (to which the option price was geared) did not fully reflect
the value of TGS stock, without having disclosed to the option com-
mittee their material information37 concerning the drilling opera-
tion.38 It was noted in passing that if the need for corporate security
should preclude disclosure to an issuer's option committee, one pos-
sible alternative might be to permit the acceptance of options so
long as they were not exercised until after full disclosure and a sub-
sequent ratification.3 9 However, absent a sound showing that corpo-
rate secrecy prevented advising the committee to postpone issuing
the options, the court refused to apply this alternative to exculpate
Kline, an officer whose options had been ratified after disclosure.
Judge Friendly suggested that TGS top management, without
breaching the required secrecy, could readily have advised their
directors comprising the option committee that it was then untimely
to grant options. He further noted that the issuer of undervalued
options in such a case might have a claim against silent members of
top management.40
5. Effective Public Disclosure
The courf affirmed Judge Bonsal's holding that Coates had vio-
lated Rule lOb-5 by ordering the purchase of TGS stock before the
April 16, 1964, formal press release had been issued despite his ar-
gument that such orders were not executed until the next day, and
that, in any event, the news of the strike was sufficiently public be-
cause of the widespread circulation of rumors, the appearance of a
Northern Miner article early on April 16 reporting the strike, and
the announcement at 9:40 A.M. on the 16th by the Canadian Min-
36 The court disagreed with Judge Bonsal's finding that Kline, a TGS vice-
president and its secretary, its general counsel at the time the options were granted,
was not a member of "top management." Id. at 857.
37 As in the case of Huntington (see note 28, supra), Kline was held despite his
ignorance of the details of the drilling because he knew generally of the favorable
developments on the Kidd property. Id. at 857 n.24.
8 Id. at 856-57.
39 Id. at 857 n.24.
40 Id. at 865. (Friendly concurring).
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ister of Mines. Judge Waterman reasoned, first, that disclosure must
be effective at the time of the placing of an order, rather than at the
time of its execution, in order to prevent insiders from gaining an
advantage in terms of additional time to evaluate information and
communicate investment decisions.41 Next, the rumors and Cana-
dian disclosures were deemed grossly inadequate substitutes for the
full formal disclosure required of an issuer with many American
shareholders, particularly since TGS had promised in its April 12
release to further advise American investors.4
With respect to Coates, who had acted immediately after the
April 16 release had been read to the press and before its anticipated
or actual appearance over the Dow Jones broad tape, the court re-
versed Judge Bonsal.48 It held that, even assuming the news of the
TGS strike could be instantly evaluated, insiders were required to
wait at least until such information became available to investors
generally through the financial media of widest circulation, the
broad tape.4" Significantly, Judge Waterman noted that
.I. where the news is of a sort which is not readily translatable
into investment action, insiders may not take advantage of their
advance opportunity to evaluate the information by acting im-
mediately upon dissemination. 45
6. Insiders' Defenses
Coates, Crawford and Clayton argued on appeal that Rule lOb-5
could not be applied to their purchase orders placed before disclo-
sure became effective because they honestly believed such disclosure
had already been made. In rejecting these claims, the court approved
the decision of Judge Bonsal46 and other courts and commentators.4
Although the court held only that the insiders' unreasonable belief
that effective disclosure had been made amounted to negligence
which violated the proper standard of the Rule in an enforcement
proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief,48 Judge Waterman's
41 Id. at 853 n.17.
42 Id. at 853-54..
48 Judge Bonsal had held that".., the making of the announcement... controls."
258 F. Supp. at 288.
44 401 F.2d at 854.
45 Id. at 854 n.18.
46 258 F. Supp. at 277, 286.
4T 401 F.2d a 854-55.
48 See authorities cited, id. at 855.
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opinion clearly implied that a negligence standard would also be
employed in private actions against insiders.49
7. The Press Release
Judge Bonsal had held that the issuance by TGS of its April 12,
1964, release, categorically denying the rumors of a strike without
disclosing the underlying facts existing as of the time of issuance,
could not violate Rule lOb-5 absent proof of a -rongful purpose in
its issuance, i.e., transactions by TGS or insiders, since it could not,
in his view, have been issued "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."50 The Second Circuit, however, adopted a
broader construction of that phrase more consonant, in its view,
with the congressional design of protecting "the interest of the in-
vester"r5 ' by requiring "honest publicity" 52 and "true and accurate
corporate reporting."5 3 Since the "in connection with" language se-
lected by Congress meant only that the vehicle used "... be of a sort
which would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon . .. [and]
cause them to purchase or sell . . ., a security, the court held that
corporate publicity is subject to the accuracy strictures of the Rule
whenever disseminated ". . . in a manner reasonably calculated to
influence the investing public, e.g., by means of the financial me-
dia, . ..,5
Next, the court took issue with Judge Bonsal's view that the
conduct of the TGS draftsmen was to be determined "on the basis
of the facts then known" to them. 6 Rather, the appropriate stan-
dard, for the application of which a remand was deemed necessary,
was whether the release would have misled or deceived "the reason-
able investor, in the exercise of due care,"57 into believing the situ-
49 Id. at 855:
A similar [negligence] standard has been adopted in private actions ... [omit-
ting citations], for policy reasons which seem perfectly consistent with the
broad congressional design " * * to insure the maintenance of fair and
honest markets in * * * [securities] transactions."
50 253 F. Supp. at 294.
51 S. REP. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934).
52 H. R. RE-P. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
53 Id.
54 401 F.2d at 860.
55 Id. at 862.
6 258 F. Supp. at 295.
67 401 F.2d at 863. For itself, the court seemed quite convinced that the release
was misleading. See also id. at 862 n.28, 862-63 (Friendly J., concurring) and 869-70
(Hays J., concurring and dissenting).
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ation was materially different than it actually was at the time of its
dissemination or as of the stated time of preparation.,, If, as urged
by TGS, no definitive conclusions or reliable projections were then
possible and some statement was necessary to clarify the rumors, it
should have, according to the court, specifically described the known
drilling progress as of the most current available report by divulging
the basic facts and indicating that the situation was rapidly chang-
ing, whether or not such disclosure would have encouraged the "ru-
mor mill."69
Finally, the court rejected Judge Bonsal's insulation of TGS by
virtue of its officers' exercise of "reasonable business judgment"
under the circumstances. 60 Having found that the trial judge had
applied an incorrect legal standard by which to assess TGS's conduct
in issuing the release, the court remanded for a determination as to
whether, if the release was found to be misleading to the reasonable
investor, its issuance in such form resulted from a lack of due dili-
gence on the part of its draftsmen. In thus applying a negligence
standard of conduct to the corporation under clause (2) of Rule
lOb-5 the court acted consistently with its approach to insiders' li-
ability under clause (3) of the Rule. Notably, however, this holding
was limited, for the moment at least, to actions for injunctive re-
lief,61 and Judge Friendly's concurrence, with which Judges Kauf-
man and Anderson agreed (as would the two dissenting judges) on
this point, clearly disapproved of the application of a negligence
standard in private actions for damages against the issuer of a mis-
leading release.6 2
D. The Dissent
Judge Moore was joined by Chief Judge Lumbard in a vehe-
ment dissent from the majority's investor-oriented construction of
Rule lOb-5. First, the dissenters urged that the TGS insiders' knowl-
edge of the drilling progress prior to April 9 (when Judge Bonsal
first deemed the drilling to be material) should not be held material
because disclosure of such progress would have been premature and
subject to the Commission's censure. 63 They claimed that disclosure
of the basic facts regarding K55-1 without conclusory assertions as
58 Id. at 864 (Friendly J., concurring).
59 Id. at 863-64 (Friendly J., concurring).
60 258 F. Supp. at 296.
61 401 F.2d 833, at 863.
62 Id. at 866-68 (Friendly J., concurring).
63 Id. at 873 (Moore J., dissenting).
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suggested by the majority would have been of no interest to anyone
except "possibly a few graduates of Institutes of Technology."64 The
majority was further criticized for having placed any reliance in de-
termining materiality upon the fact that the insiders were themselves
influenced by K55-1 in purchasing large quantities of stock and calls.
According to the dissent, the mere fact that the insiders were willing
to risk their funds on the hope that future developments would be
successful does not establish materiality.65
As for the stock option question, Judge Moore approved of the
possible alternative suggested by the majority for future reference,66
that insiders unable to disclose be free to accept options so long as
they do not exercise them until after public disclosure of material
information and subsequent ratification of the options. 7 Unlike
the majority proponents of this alternative, however, the dissenters
would have permitted the TGS insiders to invoke this defense even
absent any showing that they could not reasonably have divulged
the drilling results to the TGS option committee, or, as suggested
by Judge Friendly, 5 merely advised them that the issuance of op-
tions was not then timely.69
Next, Judge Moore accused the majority of unjustifiably revers-
ing Judge Bonsal's fact findings with respect to whether the first
TGS press release was misleading because, in his view, a negative
response to that question was implicit in Bonsal's finding that the
release was not misleading on the basis of the facts known to the
TGS draftsmen at the time of its preparation.7 0 The dissent also
pointed to the fact that the market price of TGS increased slightly
on April 13, the day the release appeared in the financial media, as
evidence of its non-pessimistic effect on the reasonable investor.7 1
No consideration was given, however, to the subsequent market de-
clines on April 14 and 15.
Finally, Judge Moore deplored the majority's interpretation7 2
of the "in connection with" phrase of Rule lOb-5 as an unwarranted
extension of congressional intent which would deter corporate dis-
64 Id. at 875-78 (Moore J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 876-77 (Moore J., dissenting).
60 See id. at 857 n.24.
67 Id. at 877-78 (Moore J., dissenting).
08 See id. at 867 (Friendly J., concurring).
09 Id. at 877-78 (Moore J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 880 (Moore J., dissenting).
71 Id.
72 See id. at 847.
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
closure.7 3 Although he assumed TGS had not been negligent in is-
suing its first release for April 13 dissemination on the basis of April
10 drilling results,74 Judge Moore further contended that merely
negligent disclosures were intended to be regulated only by state
law. 5 The protection against negligent misstatements afforded by
section 18 of the Exchange Act and the Commission's power to en-
join repeatedly misleading releases were deemed sufficient protection
for the investing public.7 6
II. ANALYSIS
A. Insiders
On the facts of Texas Gulf, there was no disagreement on the
Second Circuit as to whether the individual defendants could prop-
erly be termed "insiders" who are subject to Rule lOb-5. The claim
that the Rule applied only to those subject to section 16 of the Ex-
change Act was summarily dismissed by Judge Bonsal, as well as the
appellate court, in favor of first, an "access" test, derived from the
Commission's 1961 decision in Cady, Roberts7 7 and then a posses-
sion test.
In the context of proscribing the trading on inside information
which occurred in Texas Gulf, the Second Circuit first defined the
scope of Rule lOb-5 as applicable to "anyone who, trading for his
own account in the securities of a corporation has 'access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose.' "T (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, however, the court
had no intention of excluding from Rule lOb-5 persons who exploit
material, undisclosed information without trading for their own ac-
counts, for it held Darke, the TGS geologist, liable for a separate vi-
olation 9 of the Rule for having tipped. In addition, the above-
quoted reference to information acquired only for a corporate
purpose must be read in the context of the case wherein the inside
information had in fact been obtained by TGS officers and employ-
ees for a corporate purpose and by virtue of their relation to the
company. There obviously was no intention on the part of the ma-
73 Id. at 885-86 (Moore J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 881 (Moore J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 883 (Moore J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 885-86 (Moore J., dissenting).
77 In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 40 SYE.C. 907, 912 (1961).
78 401 F.2d at 848.
79 Darke had also been guilty of trading for his own account, both personally
and through a nominee. See id. at 840-852.
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jority to permit the advance use of otherwise material information
obtained by persons not directly related to the company or for a
non-corporate purpose. Thus, the court later declared that "anyone
in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
.. or... abstain from trading in or recommending the securities
concerned .... ", 0 (Emphasis supplied.)
Although a Rule lOb-5 violation by Darke's tippees was only
intimated,"' it seems clear that tippees too, as persons "in possession
of material inside information," are subject to the alternative duty
of disclosure or abstention notwithstanding that they receive the in-
formation for no apparent corporate purpose.8 2 Additional questions
arise, however, as to whether persons who acquire material inside
information by virtue of their connection with a corporation but for
no legitimate corporate purpose, or persons unrelated to the com-
pany who receive inside information for some actual, prospective,
or no corporate purpose, are either insiders or tippees, or both,
within the purview of the Rule, 3 and the extent to which their con-
duct is or should be circumscribed. In some cases, the lack of relation
to the company or the manner in which information is acquired will
diminish the reliability of the information or preclude its verifica-
tion or continued validity, but these factors can more appropriately
be considered in determining whether the information is, under
such circumstances, material.84 Assuming materiality, however, the
primary purpose of the Rule, i.e., placing all investors on equal foot-
inge and rewarding investment analysis and risk, suggests no basis
for distinguishing between corporate managers, on the one hand, and
on the other, a secretary, messenger or elevator operator employed
80 Id. at 848.
81 Albeit strongly. Id. at 852-53.
82 See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Also, it should be
noted that since most "tippees" would be unauthorized and/or unable to effect
disclosure, this duty would normally require total abstention from trading and recom-
mending. For further discussion of problems relating to "tippees", see pp. 256-9, infra.
83 To the extent that varying duties and liabilities may be imposed on insiders
or tippees, this classification may prove significant.
84 See pp. 242-56, infra. But see Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of
Corporate Disclosure Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 425, 436-57 (1969),
to the effect that the touchstone of the Rule is the concept of "information-yielding
relationships." If this be true, which we doubt, see text accompanying notes 87-95,
infra, then courts and companies will be unnecessarily confronted with difficult clas-
sification problems in determining who has access to material inside information, see
id., when the crucial inquiry should be whether one who has acted actually possessed
material inside information.
86 401 F.2d at 848, 851-852.
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by a public company who overhears or intercepts undisclosed infor-
mation about their or another company, or an accountant, lawyer,
financial adviser, public relations agent, investment or commercial
banker, underwriter, corporate trustee, registrar, transfer agent, cus-
tomer, supplier, competitor or stockholder who may obtain such in-
formation in the course of an existing or prospective relationship
with a company.
Although members of the latter group may lack a fiduciary duty
to the particular company and members of the former group may
have limited responsibilities commensurate with their functions, an
insider's obligations need no longer depend upon the incidents of
such a special relationship.86 Rather, after Texas Gulf, such obliga-
tions derive from a duty to the investing public87 which supersedes
all other potentially conflicting private duties, 88 because uninformed
investors are equally disadvantaged vis--vis non-fiduciaries or lower-
echelon agents trading on material inside information as they would
be with respect to trading by corporate managers, except to the ex-
tent that these "inner insiders" have still greater and at least super-
ficially more reliable inside information than the aforementioned
"outer insiders." 89 Nor can any general distinction between such
86 Misuse of material inside information obtained by virtue of a broker-dealer's
"special relationship" as prospective underwriter and investment banker of the issuer
was the commission's basis for the violation charged after Texas Gulf in In re Van
Alstyne, Noel & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,656, at 83,433, 83,436 (S.E.A. Rel.
No. 8511, Jan. 31, 1969). See also In Te Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &- Smith, Inc.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 77,629 at 83,349 (S.E.A. Rel. No. 8459, Nov. 25, 1968),
[hereinafter cited as Merrill Lynch] ("business relationship'); Note, supra, note 84, 43
ST. JOHN'S L. REv, at 436-37 ("special relationships').
87 See 401 F.2d at 848, where Judge Waterman declared that "the Rule is based
in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities market place that all investors
trading on impersonal exchange have relatively equal access to material information.
. . ." See also Remarks of S.E.C. Solicitor David E. Ferber, Transcript of Practising
Law Institute Panel on Texas Gulf Sulphur, Oct. 1968, at 235 (hereinafter cited as
PLI TRANscRuPT).
88 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch note 86 supra, in which the Commission's charge was
based on a brokerage firm's passing material inside information concerning a sub-
stantial earnings decline of a company which had previously been recommended by
the firm to certain of its customers, notwithstanding its private fiduciary duty to act
for their benefit. It was noted that the violation would not have been cured if the
information had been given to all of the firm's customers because it would have been
unfair to the remainder of the investing public. Id. at 83,349-50 n.8.
89 It is not intended to ignore the likelihood that corporate managers generally
have more detailed and reliable material undisclosed information than others whose
relation to the company is less intimate or who acquire information fortuitously. In
fact, this premise is basic to the presumptions underlying section 16(b) of the Ex-
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classes of insiders be drawn in terms of their relative capacity to
comply with the mandate of the Rule for all that is required is
abstention until the information becomes publicly available and
anyone may be able to ascertain such availability to the extent that
he can obtain an up-to-date report on the particular security from a
broker or by following the financial media.90
In this view, it is not by inadvertence that we find in Judge
Waterman's opinion, in addition to an exposition of the "access"
delineation of insiders as specifically applied to the TGS insiders, a
broader definition of "insider" drawn to include "anyone in posses-
sion of material, inside information." 91 The point is that anyone
who at any time possesses material, undisclosed information can take
advantage of it at the expense of the uninformed public, irrespective
of his relation to the company or his general access to such informa-
tion, and should, therefore, be subject to Rule lOb-5.9 2 While there
are valid reasons for permitting certain corporate officials9 3 and
perhaps some outsiders94 advance access to material inside informa-
change Act. Rather, all that is suggested herein is that differences in relative access
to inside information can best be treated more consistently with the design of Rule
lOb-5, on an individual basis in terms of materiality.
00 With respect to relative capacities to determine materiality of information, a
rule of thumb implicit in Texas Gulf, which can be followed by even an uneducated
lower-level employee, is that if information is sufficiently important to induce an im-
mediate investment decision by an "outer" or "inner" insider, it is sufficiently likely
to be material to require abstention or disclosure. See Henderson, PLI TRANSCRIPT,
supra note 87, at 165. Clearly, such employees will not divine rules of safe conduct
from reading the Texas Gulf opinion or this article; a major educational effort will
be required of public corporations, banks, brokerage firms and other businesses which
deal with inside information.
91 See text accompanying notes 78-80, supra.
92 The authors believe that this is, and should be, the law as a matter of policy,
while fully recognizing the present difficulty, if not impossibility, of proof and enforce-
ment in many instances. The applicability of this policy analysis to tippees is discussed
at pp. 256-9, infra.
03 For example, members of a corporation's stock option committee should prob-
ably be advised previously of undisclosed significant corporate development not yet
ripe for public release, if necessary to prevent the granting of options at prices which
do not fairly reflect the value of the corporation's stock. See 401 F.2d at 865 (Friendly,
J., concurring).
94 Professor Mundheim has suggested the doubtful proposition that security ana-
lysts should not be treated as insiders because they perform a useful function in dis-
seminating and analyzing investment information. Digest of Panel Discussion on
"What Is Proper Information for Security Analysts?" before New York Society of Se-
curity Analysts, Inc., Nov. 12, 1968, pp. 6-7 (hereinafter cited as NYSSA DirGsr). A com-
plete transcript of the panel proceedings is available at the library of the Society.
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tion, there can be no justification for allowing any of them to profit
at the public's expense.95
B. Materiality
1. The Applicable Standard
Perhaps the single most significant portion of the Texas Gulf
opinion, and that which has been most disturbing to the investment
community" and commentators,97 is its discussion of materiality. On
the facts presented to the court, its holding as to materiality should
hardly have been surprising, in view of the obvious importance at-
tached to even one successful drill core, by many traders in the "spec-
ulative sixties."98s In fact, the hue and cry generated by this part of
the decision seems to be attributable to a failure to read the court's
supposedly disparate statements on materiality in the context of the
several objectives apparently sought to be accomplished by the opin-
ion, i.e., refuting the arguments of the defendants and the district
court, restating the general rule applicable to non-disclosure cases
consistent with prior authorities, issuing safe guidelines for insiders'
individual actions, and suggesting, in the absence of Commission
regulation, standards for corporate disclosure.
Judge Moore's dissent appears to stem from a confusion of the
latter two purposes and an unwarranted amalgamation of the dual
alternative duties of disclosure or abstention established in Cady,
Roberts. 9 The dissenters' principal complaint against the majority
view of materiality was that the information as to K55-1 was not ripe
for public disclosure. 0 However valid may be the reasons for non-
disclosure of drilling progress at such an early stage of develop-
ment,10' and the majority expressly reserved resolution of the tim-
95 See Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf Sul-
phur, 28 MD. L. REv. 189, 221, 223 (1968), proposing that security analysts be ac-
corded a preferred status in obtaining undisclosed corporate data (except predictions
of corporate earnings) if, and only if, they are willing to make their reports available
to the public.
96 Wall St. Journal, Nov. 14, 1968, at 3, col. 2 & 3.
97 See Remarks of Professor Bromberg, PLI TRANscPnr, supra note 87, at 204-05.
98 See 401 F.2d at 850-51, where the court considered the testimony of a mining
stock specialist to the effect that completion of the first hole, especially one as rich
and long as K55-1, was "'very, very significant"' and that "it 'is a natural thing to
buy more stock once they give you the first drill hole.'"
99 40 S..C. 907, 911-12 (1961).
100 401 F.2d at 873.
101 It should, however, be noted that, if TGS had otherwise been willing to
divulge the results of K55-1, there should have been no reason why it could not have
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ing of disclosure to business judgment, the Commission and the
exchanges, 102 it does not then follow, a fortiori, that insiders may none-
theless reap an advantage at the expense of the uninformed public.10 3
The unarticulated premise in the dissent's position is that insiders
should always be as free to trade in their companies' securities as
members of the public, however uninformed, else any restrictions
on their freedom will deter them from serving the corporate world
that urgently requires their assistance. 04 This is, however, a matter
of policy on which Congress has unequivocally taken the contrary
position, 10 5 for reasons which are as persuasive today as they were in
1934.100 Similarly, Judge Moore's disagreement as to the impact of
K55-1 on the reasonable investor, i.e., that it could not be material
because "one drill hole does not reveal a commercially profitable
mine" and only mining engineers would have valued the assay of
K55-1,107 ignores the thrust of the majority's position and manifests
the type of naivet6 of which he later accuses his brethren. 08 Obvi-
fully reported the basic facts so long as it disclaimed any premature conclusions or
predictions.
102 401 F.2d at 850 n.12.
103 For an extremely effective statement of the case against insider trading, see
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1438-57 (1967).
104 This is apparently the view of at least one commentator. See H. Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966) (passim).
105 See 401 F.2d at 848 n.9, and authorities cited therein. Certainly, if Congress
had been willing to permit insider trading, it would not have enacted section 16(b)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b). The authors recognize that it is trading that
is condemned in § 16(b), i.e., short-term purchases and sales in any combination, and
that the argument may be made that purchases by insiders, standing alone, are not
contrary to the policy expressed in § 16(b) or any other policy expressly articulated in
the Exchange Act. It is, nevertheless, clear to the authors that the use in any one
transaction of information fortuitously learned and not generally available is unfair
to others (and the purchases by the informed TGS insiders was certainly unfair to
the uninformed sellers who sold at an artificially low price) and is therefore a
wrong, which the overall investor protection principle underlying the Exchange Act
must embrace as a form of prohibited conduct.
100 As noted by the majority, insider trading profits "are forms of secret corporate
compensation ...derived at the expense of the uninformed investing public and it
is not at the expense of the corporation which receives the sole benefit from insider
incentives." 401 F.2d at 851. It has also been observed that "[i]f insiders are free to
trade on undisclosed, material information, they are subject to a conflict of interest
that may affect their judgment not only in the timing of disclosure, but also in the
timing of the underlying events themselves." Schotland, supra note 103.
107 401 F.2d at 875.
108 See id. at 888-89.
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ously, the mere possibility of a commercially profitable mine could
have influenced reasonable, if speculative, investors to buy TGS
stock 1 9 and, if so, any subsequent disclosure of such possibility would
have increased the market price and enabled insiders to profit un-
fairly.
The dissenters' final point of contention regarding materiality
was the majority's purported adoption of a subjective standard which
necessarily appraised the facts as they existed at any given time with
the aid of hindsight.110 However, in accusing the majority of con-
fusing the insiders' motives with knowledge of material information,
Judge Moore not only failed to propose more objective criteria in
cases like Texas Gulf where actual market changes were unavail-
able;"1 significantly, he also ignored the expert112 testimony indicat-
ing the importance of K55-1 as well as the strong inferences flowing
from the fact that not one, but nearly all, of the insiders had engaged
in securities transactions, some of them quite speculative and for the
short-term, after learning of K55-1. Surely, it was not totally unrea-
sonable for the majority to have preferred to treat such facts as
more than mere coincidence rather than making the unsupportable
presumption that none of the insiders could be deemed to have
acted as a reasonable investor.
The remaining difficulties with the majority's discussion of ma-
teriality derive from its inclusion of supposedly variant standards
which have collectively been interpreted as establishing an imprac-
ticably low "threshold of materiality." 113 The opinion first declared
that Rule lOb-5 was applicable
109 See id. at 849-50.
110 Id. at 876-77.
111 Note, supra note 85, 43 ST. JoaN's L. RlEv. at 447. Compare In re Van Alstyne,
Noel & Co., supra note 86, at 83,435 n.7, where the precise information acted upon
by insiders was subsequently disclosed, thereby permitting the use of market reaction
to confirm materiality.
112 See note 98, supra. Other objective evidence of nonmateriality of an expert
nature would be the financial media's refusal to publish the information in question.
See Ferber, PLI TRANscRwPr, supra note 87, at 238. This refusal would not, of course,
be conclusive and a concerned company might consider taking an advertisement in
the newspaper most relevant to the company and advising all brokers dealing in the
stock of the development. In this situation, SEC Solicitor Ferber was reported to have
suggested a mailing to shareholders, N. Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1968, p. 77, col. 3, but if the
information were material, such selective disclosure might aggravate the problem. Cf.
In re Merrill Lynch, supra note 86, at 88, 349-50 n.8.
113 See Bromberg, PLI TRANsupr, supra, note 87, at 204-05.
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only in 'those situations which are essentially extraordinary in
nature and which are reasonably certain to have a substantial
effect on the market price of the security if ... disclosed."' 4
The court then appeared to invoke a broader definition in terms of
'any fact ... which in reasonable and objective contemplation
might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities.' 5
The basic test of materiality was generally restated from List v.
Fashion Park, Inc.,' 6 as
'whether a reasonable man would attach importance [to the par-
ticular information] in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question.'n 7
Concluding that speculators were not per se excluded from the class
of reasonable investors entitled to information important to their
investment decisions, the court emphasized that
material facts include not only information disclosing the earn-
ings and distributions of a company but also those facts which
affect the probable future of the company and those which may
affect the desire of investors to buy, sell or hold the company's
securities." 8
Finally, with respect to corporate developments not yet completed
114 401 F.2d at 848, quoting from Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate In-
formation Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA.
L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965).
115 401 F.2d at 849, quoting from, List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 540 F.2d 457, 462
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
116 List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
117 340 F.2d at 462, adopted by TGS court 401 F.2d at 849.
11s 401 F.2d at 849. An interesting case of undisclosed information significant to
both the intrinsic value of the corporation's stock and to the desire of investors was
presented in SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc. CCH FEn. Sac. L. RE.P. 92,325
(2d Cir. No. 31010, Dec. 23, 1968) where the Commission obtained injunctive relief
under Rule 10b-5 for a company's failure to disclose (in its press releases and Form
8K), or even ascertain the fact, that approximately two-thirds of the consideration paid
by it in stock for certain real estate was to be paid to finders. Such a fact was material
because a prospective purchaser of the company's stock might reasonably doubt that
the property was worth the price paid, id. at 97,540, and thereby question the under-
lying asset value of the stock. Also, such a fact would most probably affect an in-
vestor's confidence in management, a factor more directed to investors' desire for the
stock. See also Hendricks v. Flato Realty Investments, CCH FE. SFc. L. RaP. 92,290
(S.D.Tex. No. CA. 67C-92 September 9, 1968), where the information material to the
plaintiff concerned the willingness of other reputable businessmen to accept stock
of a company in exchange for certain well-known properties, id. at 97,387.
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or of indefinite magnitude, the court instructed that materiality in
each case
will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the in-
dicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
activity .1. .19
It is submitted that, taken in the context of the arguments pre-
sented to the court and its various purposes, these statements are
neither mutually exclusive, disparate nor impracticable. Further-
more, in an area as vast and variant as materiality, it would require
articulative powers unknown to both the bar and to the bench to ex-
pect single-sentence statements of all-embracing scope and clarity.
The basic standard incorporating the hypothetical reasonable
investor presents no conceptual novelty since it has long been used
in common law cases120 and has undoubtedly been a major criterion
employed by the Commission in ascertaining the materiality of state-
ments required in documents filed with it. Likewise, the express in-
clusion within the concept of materiality of facts which affect a cor-
poration's future or the desire of other investors to buy, sell or hold
its stock was no great departure from prior understanding' 2l for
such items, which may have greater importance to speculative than
conservative investors, have been consistently required disclosures
under Commission and exchange rules.22 The balancing test pro-
119 401 F.2d at 849.
120 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 532(a) (1988); HARPER & JAmS, ToRTs, 565-66 (1st
ed. 1956). Learned treatises notwithstanding, the authors recognize the practical, as
contrasted with conceptual, difficulty of this determination. A professional broker may
assert with no little persuasion that the "reasonable investor" is as rare as human
perfection. If so, a fortiorari, the need for the Texas Gulf type results.
121 Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), finding trading
by an investment adviser based upon its knowledge that its subsequently disseminated
investment reports would influence advisees to be fraudulent practice under Section
206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1965), the language of which
is, in part, virtually identical to that of Rule lOb-5.
122 See item l(a) of Form 8-K, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 31,003, requiring dis-
closure of changes in control, item 6 of Form 10-K, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 31,103,
requiring disclosure of the background of directors, and item 16 of Form S-1, 1 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 7123, requiring background of executive officers and directors. See
also NEw YoRx STOCK EXCHANGE COMsPANY MANUAL A-22 (July 1968), listing stocks
splits, news of major new products, contract awards, discoveries and expansion
plans among information which should be immediately released to the public. It is also
expressly contemplated that announcements of preliminary developments may be nec-
essary, presumably because they are "material notwithstanding their indefiniteness." Id.
at A-19.
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posed by Judge Waterman was no more than an articulation of the
considerations to be employed by a reasonable investor in determin-
ing the investment action, if any, to be taken on the basis of
knowledge of a corporate development which has not yet occurred
or the magnitude of which is not yet ascertainable, and seems suf-
ficiently flexible to withstand substantial criticism.123
The statement that material developments will be "essentially
extraordinary" and "reasonably certain to have a substantial effect
on the market price" is a valuable qualification of the foregoing
standards which assumes, quite properly, that the reasonable, if
speculative, investor will not take immediate investment action 24
after utilizing the balancing process upon learning, e.g., of a nor-
mal corporate development which has been readily anticipated or
discounted by the majority of reasonable investors in the security;
if such a common development were to substantially influence an
investor, perhaps because he had previously been unfamiliar with
the company, the industry or the market generally or because he
placed unique value on such an event, he would fall without the
class of reasonable investors. In effect, it is this latter qualification
123 See Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality And Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 28 MD. L. Rxv. 189, 207 (1968).
124 It should be noted that absent such immediate action by the many reasonable
investors, disclosure of information would not substantially affect the market price of
a security. Conversely, immediate action would not be reasonable if no such sub-
stantial effect on the market price were to result from disclosure for such lack of
effect would indicate that most reasonable investors did not consider the information
significant.
SEC General Counsel, Philip A. Loomis, has incorporated this concept in his
definition of materiality, given to the Financial Analysts Federation Fall Conference
on Oct. 7, 1968, CCH Flm. SEc. L. RE'. 77,624 (hereinafter cited as FAF DIGMsr), by
requiring information to be of a sort which would have a "substantial and immediate"
impact on the market price of a security, i.e., a price change within a trading day or
two after dissemination which would perceptibly exceed the security's day-to-day or
week-to-week trading norms. See also Henderson, PLI TRAxscrWr, supra note 87, at
168: "the common sense way of phrasing the test is, if the fellow hearing the news ...
figures he had better act on it right now or before tomorrow morning, surely it's
material." But see Ferber, NYSSA DIGEST, supra note 94, at 5, to the effect that the
"substantial effect required by the Texas Gulf definition of materiality may be either
long or short-term. It is interesting to note that Mr. Ferber had, one month earlier,
expressed his agreement with Mr. Loomis' "immediate and substantial" terminology.
See PLI TRANSCRIPT, supra, note 87, at 314. That projections of future sales, cash
flow, earnings and acquisitions may be material, presumably because they would have
an immediate market impact if substantially different from public understanding, see
SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., CCH FmD. SEc. L. REP. 92,280 (S.D.N.Y. No. 68 Civ. 3203,
Aug. 7, 1968).
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which ensures that public corporations and the financial media, as
well as reasonable investors, will not be unnecessarily imposed upon
by the required dissemination of trivia.12 5
It should, however, be noted that events which are "essentially
extraordinary" in respect of one corporation may not be so for an-
other. For example, news of acquisitions and offers thereof may be
considered more common for the group of aggressive, growth-ori-
ented conglomerates than for already huge old-line companies which
have resisted diversification and external expansion, though they will
still usually be essentially extraordinary in terms of market impact.
Similarly, new product developments and discoveries of new re-
sources are more usual in certain industries than in others. To the
extent that the market price of a company's securities may already
have substantially discounted generally anticipated developments
regarding the company which would, for most companies, be "es-
sentially extraordinary," disclosure of such developments may not
have the requisite "substantial effect" on the market price because
reasonable investors might not be motivated into immediate action.
In this event, which would appear to be a rarity, there may be no
inherent unfairness, or at least no demonstrable proof thereof, in
permitting insiders to trade. Thus, the "essentially extraordinary"
requirement should be determined by reference to the particular
company concerned, in much the same manner and for the same
purpose as the "anticipated magnitude" of an event is assessed, i.e.,
to ascertain whether disclosure would have the substantial market
impact without which there is little, if any, justification for prohib-
iting insider trading. 2 6
Similarly, the reasonable investor's reaction is the focal point
125 This qualification of the more general definitional statements of materiality
has been seized upon by most courts and commentators treating the subject as the
true "rule of the case." See, e.g., Britt v. The Cyril Bath Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. RrsP.
92,267 (N.D. Ohio, No. C 67-717, Sept. 16, 1968); Loomis, FAF DIGEsr supra note
124; Remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin, PLI TRANstrp-, supra note 87, at 139; Re-
marks of SEC Solicitor David E. Ferber, id. at 228-29; Ferber, NYSSA DIGEsT, supra
note 94 at 5. See also Remarks of SEC Chairman Hamer H. Budge, then a Commis-
sion member, but not Chairman, before New York Chapter of American Society of
Corporate Secretaries, Nov. 18, 1965, quoted in Wiesen, supra note 123, at 206;
Cary, Symposium: Insider Trading In Stocks, 21 Bus. LW. 1009, 1014 (1966).
126 See text accompanying notes 124 and 125, supra. A blanket prohibition against
insider trading without any objective likelihood of materiality would effectively pre-
clude the use of perceptive analysis and "educated" guesses, which Texas Gulf sought
to preserve, see 401 F.2d at 848-49, and deprive them and their companies of the
valuable incentives derived from legitimate investments.
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in determining materiality, not only because he is within the class
sought to be protected by the Rule, but also because his reaction will
produce the requisite market impact which justifies insider restric-
tions. For this reason, the class of reasonable investors should be de-
fined for materiality purposes to include both the average small in-
vestor, whose collective action will substantially affect the market,
and any sizable group of sophisticated or professional investors whose
trading volume will likewise affect the market. Information which
would influence either class of investors will, when disclosed, cause
the market to rise or fall, as the case may be, and provide insiders
with their unfair profit.
The sole remaining statement of the majority as to materiality,
i.e., facts are material if, in "reasonable and objective contempla-
tion," they "might affect the value of the corporation's stock or se-
curities," (Emphasis supplied as before) can and should be construed
on several different levels. Analytically, it is a further confirmation
of the court's adherence to the concept of the reasonable investor.
Thus, it is also a clear indication of the adoption, to the extent
possible in each case, of an objective standard of materiality within
which a particular investor's unique motivation will be substantially
disregarded in favor of the reactions of a class of presumably rea-
sonable investors, as confirmed by those of expert investment
analysts and advisers.
Next, this pejorative language of the court must be read on a
first level in the context of the defendants' and Judge Bonsal's con-
tention that materiality should be determined by reference to the
prudent investor, whose sole concern was with events which affect a
security's intrinsic value. In this view, the court was merely empha-
sizing, consistently with its rejection of the restrictive concept of the
prudent investor, which is a trustee's test, not a securities law test,
that information could be material, i.e., sufficiently important to
influence the market and permit insider exploitation, even if its
effect on a security's underlying value was not certain, but merely
possible, as was the case in Texas Gulf.12 7
On a second level, however, the court may also have been in-
structing insiders to exercise great caution in their use of corporate
information. In other words, when the effect of disclosure of a par-
127 This was undoubtedly the primary meaning intended by the court in uttering
its pejorative language, notably without reference to the effect of such information on
the market value of the security if disclosed, virtually in the same breath as its prior
reference to essentially extraordinary information reasonably certain to have a sub-
stantial effect on the market price of the security if disclosed.
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ticular development on the market value of a security cannot be
predicted with certainty, but may be substantial, insiders would be
well-advised to forego investment action until disclosure. As insid-
ers' transactions may themselves permit an inference of materiality,
such advice appears to be quite sound. Indeed, the court's holding
that Kline and Huntington, neither of whom had detailed knowl-
edge of the drilling, possessed material information seems to verify
the application of a stricter standard to insiders.1
28
Moreover, in view of the various legitimate reasons for non-
disclosure of preliminary developments such as a potential ore strike
or acquisition but the absence of any justification for insider invest-
ment activity, the court, on yet a third level, may even have been
suggesting a more stringent materiality test for insider activity than
for the timing of affirmative disclosure. It is certainly arguable that
although insiders might be so familiar with a company and the mar-
ket for its securities that a relatively normal development which
may not be "reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the
market price" may nevertheless yield them an unfair investment
advantage and require their abstention, the company need not dis-
close such events not "essentially extraordinary in nature" which
would be insignificant to the reasonable investor.129
2. Extrinsic Components of Materiality
Certain additional materiality problems not clearly presented
in Texas Gulf may also be resolved by reference to the standards
suggested in the opinion. First, there is the question of how specific
information must be in order to be termed material and activate the
obligations of Rule 1Ob-5. Intimately related to this issue is the prob-
lem of reliability of information which will commonly arise in the
case of one who becomes an "insider" by his fortuitous receipt and
possession of information but lacks a relationship yielding access to
such data or has not obtained it for a corporate purpose. Both speci-
ficity and reliability, hence materiality, are likely to be diminished
in direct proportion to the distance between the recipient of infor-
mation and its initial source.180 In addition, the knowledge of the
recipient that the information in the form received, however vague,
derives from an authoritative source may itself be material insofar
128 See text accompanying notes 132-34, infra.
129 The unfair advantage in this context might derive not from the expert analy-
sis expressly sanctioned by Texas Gulf, but from an insider's knowledge of several facts
which, only in combination, would influence the reasonable investor upon disclosure.
3.0 See Bromberg, PLI Tmsawr, supra note 87, at 208-09.
[Vol. so
TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
as it assures reliability.'3 ' All of these factors must be thrown onto
the scales in performing the balancing test formulated by Texas
Gulf to discount the investment value of either or both basic fac-
tors, i.e., indicated probability that an event will occur or its an-
ticipated magnitude, to which the inside information relates.
This balancing exercise in Texas Gulf yielded a finding of
materiality as to defendants Huntington and Kline but not as to
Murray, though none of them had detailed knowledge of the drill-
ing progress at the time of his transaction in TGS stock. Hunting-
ton, a TGS attorney who participated in the Kidd land acquisition,
appears to have been held for acting upon material information as
a result of judicial inferences drawn from his proximity 32 to TGS
officials who knew all about K55-1 and his purchase, unusual for
him, of short-term calls on the same day that he had prepared a sub-
stantial written offer by TGS for the Kidd property. The court ap-
parently felt that reliable, albeit non-detailed, knowledge of "the
highly favorable nature of preliminary operations" was material,133
in view of the great magnitude of any resulting strike and of the
tremendous impact which such general knowledge had on Hunting-
ton, a presumably reasonable investor, in inducing him to purchase
calls for the first time. Kline was held to have violated Rule lOb-5
by accepting stock options under less auspicious circumstances pre-
sumably because he had been TGS's secretary, and later a vice-pres-
ident and its general counsel, although he had known only that
K55-1 had intersected a sulphide body containing copper and zinc
and that TGS sought to acquire the Kidd parcel.134 Murray's rela-
tion to the knowledgeable insiders, the extent of his general knowl-
edge of K55-1 and the nature of his transactions were not discussed
by the court in affirming dismissal of the charges against him. 35
Thus, it appears that lack of specific information will not preclude
a finding of materiality as to "inner insiders," at least when their
general knowledge is highly reliable and the prospective magnitude
of the particular development is great.
The notion of reliability poses special problems in terms of ma-
teriality. Suppose, for example, that a low-level company or broker-
age firm employee receives specific information concerning an event
131 Cf. id. at 210.
132 The court notes that Huntington's general understanding of the situation was
"probably reliable." 401 F.2d at 583.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 857 n.24.
135 Id. at 852 n.14.
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of great magnitude vis-4-vis the company concerned, but has no
knowledge as to its reliability because he is unable reasonably to
determine its initial source.3 6 In similar circumstances, it has been
generally suggested that he may trade without restriction.aT This
resolution seems, at first, correct for most cases since the reasonable,
if speculative, investor would not normally take immediate invest-
ment action on such a basis in a market in which unreliable rumors
are rampant and, further, because enforcement of Rule lOb-5 in such
cases would, under present circumstances, necessarily be either im-
practical or so piecemeal as to border on injustice. It might also be
argued, though not, in our judgment, persuasively, that to render
transactions on such bases unlawful would create an uncertainty
which would unduly disturb the current standards of the securities
marketplace.
In response to these latter points, however, it should be ob-
served that legitimate market interest is likely, in the long run, to
be deterred by in any way encouraging reliance, particularly by the
irregular or small investor, upon unreliable information and that
any market standard which condones unfairness demands change.
The enforcement problem cannot realistically be ignored but its
solution demands, not a relaxation of otherwise indicated standards,
but administrative improvement.
Nor should it be summarily assumed that a reasonable specu-
lator would never act upon such information without some knowl-
edge of the source. If the magnitude of the event on which he has
detailed information is sufficiently great, the event is not of the sort
subject to rapid change, and the market has not already discounted
some close version of his information, he, like the TGS insiders,
takes little, if any, risk in acting (particularly if he deals in options)
136 This, of course, excludes the case where the recipient of information has no
assurance that the ultimate source of his information is official but knows that his
source is generally reliable and likely to possess some direct or indirect connection to
an official source, in which case there would be some degree of reliability perhaps
sufficient to prompt a reasonable speculator into action.
137 SEC General Counsel Loomis is reported to have stated that a security ana-
lyst who receives information "second-hand and has no reason to believe that his
informant was... breaching any duty by making such a disclosure," the analyst was
"home free." See FAF Djicsr, supra note 124. However, if the informant were a
generally reliable source, the recipient should be on notice that someone in the chain
of communication was breaching a duty and, furthermore, assuming reliability, he
and all who passed the information would be violating their public duty. Moreover,
even accidentally received information may be reliable and, if so, highly material.
See Meeker, PLI TRaAscnrs, supra note 87, at 521.
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and may stand to gain a great deal. The risk is greater, but still tol-
erable, if the event is subject to fluctuation so long as the market has
clearly not discounted the event. If, on the other hand, the market
price already reflects some approximation of the event in question,
the risk of loss is probably too great for a reasonable speculator, even
in the case of an event which requires no further development or
finalization. In the above situations, where the reasonable speculator
would take immediate action on specific but unreliable (particularly
in the sense of unconfirmable) information, it is submitted that
the "equal footing" and "fundamental fairness" rationales of Texas
Gulf require a finding of materiality as a predicate for imposing the
Rule 1Ob-5 duty of abstention. Of course, if the information is
neither specific nor reliable, it would clearly not be material.
3. Externally Generated Information
One particularly troublesome category of information, which
may be material if specific and reliable to the extent previously
noted, is that of "market" information, i.e., information about a
company or the desire of other investors for its securities which is
generated externally and has no initial company source. At least one
commentator has apparently taken the position that such informa-
tion should not be within the scope of Rule l0b-5,138 but others have
counseled caution.139 Indeed, in view of the express inclusion in
Texas Gulf of information which affects the desire of other investors
for the stock 40 and the court's primary concern with preventing some
investors from profiting by subsequent substantial price changes solely
by virtue of their possession of factual information unavailable to
others, some market information seems clearly material and, if un-
available' 41 to the investing public,' 2 should not be acted upon.
138 Bromberg, P1I TRANSCRIPT, supra note 87, at 323: "You get entirely out
of the category of inside information to the extent that its not from the company."
(emphasis supplied.) In all fairness to Professor Bromberg, the above statement may
have been intended to exclude from the strictures of the Rule only information which
is publicly available and, therefore, not "inside." Such information may indeed be
material but its private use does not violate the Rule's precept of "fundamental fair-
ness" to the extent that all enterprising investors have equal access to it.
139 See Ferber, PLI TRANscRIPr, supra note 87, at 235; Meeker, PLI TRANSc.IPr,
supra note 87, at 320.
140 See note 118, supra and accompanying text.
141 In many, if not all, market information cases, neither the recipient nor the
source will be in a position to disclose their knowledge to the public. However, in
view of the assertion in Texas Gulf that "[t]he only regulatory objective is that access
to material information be enjoyed equally .. . " 401 F.2d at 849 (emphasis supplied),
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One common example -of market information is knowledge of
an impending tender offer by one company for the publicly traded
shares of another; such information is clearly material to the value
of the latter company's stock. Similarly, a proposed merger or ac-
quisition of substantially all of the assets of a public company results
in an offer, in essence, to purchase the merged or acquired company's
shares and can significantly affect the value of such shares. Such in-
formation is unquestionably material, whether or not derived from
company sources, and, if sufficiently specific143 and reliable,'144 should
not be utilized until publicly disclosed. 145
and the court's approval of the use of "financial or expert analysis" and "evaluative
expertise," id. at 848-49, it would seem sufficient that the information be publicly
available though not formally disclosed. Much of this information, e.g., insider
transactions reported on SEC Form 4 pursuant to section 16(a) of the Exchange Act
of trading volume in listed securities, is available through the financial media and
a large part of the remainder can be obtained through brokers.
142 It is not intended to deny to expert insiders or perceptive outsiders the benefit
of their superior analyses. See Cady, Roberts, supra note 77; Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at
848-49.
143 The history of tender or exchange offers, special bids, and perhaps to a some-
what lesser extent, merger and acquisition bids, suggest that such proposals usually
offer cash or securities exceeding the then current market value of the shares to be
acquired or liquidated. Thus, a much lower level of specificity would be required by
the reasonable, if speculative, investor before taking action. Furthermore, the great
magnitude in terms of market impact of developments such as tender offers may indi-
cate that mere knowledge of the possibility of a tender, as might, e.g., be possessed by
a broker engaged in a massive, short-term purchase program for a customer, may be
material. Of course, to the extent that such a program is reasonably likely to affect
the market for a security, knowledge thereof is itself material.
144 In this context, the initial or official source of the information would be the
acquiring company and any informant reasonably connected thereto, e.g., the dealer-
manager of an offeror or one learning of the offer from him, could be considered
reliable.
145 Such information is not usually publicly available until after disclosure though
it may be given privately to certain brokers and institutional investors. Senate Anti-
trust and Monopoly Committee Chief Counsel Jerry Cohen and Chairman Marvin
Finell of Great American Industries, Inc. are reported to have said that selective dis-
closure by brokers to certain institutional investors in order to induce their pur-
chasing stock and then tendering, a practice known as "warehousing" desired securities
into friendly hands, was improper. N. Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1969, at 59, col. 8 (city ed.).
However, it must be observed that the public is no more injured by this practice than
if the acquiring company had borrowed the funds to make such purchases for its own
account or if, as is commonly done, a broker is employed to buy up all available
shares for a stated profit. Since such institutions or brokers may be deemed agents
of the acquiring company, which is not required by Rule lOb-5 to disclose its inten-
tions prior to making its offer, see General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., CCH
FED. Sac. L. RaE'. 92,291 at 97,394 (2d Cir. Nos. 32299 & 32300, Oct. 23, 1968), if full
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The interpretive judicial development of Rule lOb-5 could
ultimately embrace externally generated information concerning an
issuer,146 and other information concerning an issuer can be rele-
vant to an alert investing public. The latter category could include
changes in management' 47 or its fitness,148 the identity of other
investors purchasing large quantities of the issuer's securities149
and even an impending investment advisory service recommenda-
tion.15 Such judicial development may also encompass advance
information as to unusual trading volume or availability of securi-
ties for trading,151 particularly if there are allegations of a breach of
disclosure of their acts in behalf of their principal is made pursuant to Sections 13
and 14 of the Exchange Act and the Commission's rules thereunder, no violation of
Rule lOb-5 would seem warranted.
140 See Meeker, PLI TRANscauiT, supra note 87, at 320.
147 For example, the market price of Hygrade Food Products Corporation com-
mon stock on the American Stock Exhange increased from 42/ to 753/s in the space
of a few weeks primarily as a result of the announcement on December 5, 1968 that
the controlling shares had been sold to Beck Industries, whose principals had estab-
lished a reputation for capital growth. See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 5, 1968, at 5, col. 2.
148 Cf. SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc., supra note 117, where it was held
material to stockholders of a corporation that two-thirds of the aggregate considera-
tion received by the company for certain real estate were paid by the seller as finders'
fees.
149 See, e.g., Hendricks v. Flato Realty Investments, supra note 117 (by implica-
tion). The mere fact that an insider is on the other end of the transaction is not,
however, material in itself. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied sub nom, List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Ross v. Licht, 263 F.
Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 3 L. Loss, SEcuarrtss REGULATION 1465 (2d ed. 1961).
Knowledge of substantial insider transactions may, however, be important to a specu-
lator, though perhaps an unreasonable one, and, in addition, may indicate a change
in management's interest in and control of the company.
160 Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., supra note 120 (by impli-
cation).
151 Great potential abuse is inherent in a market-maker's unique knowledge of
the trading volume in an unlisted security for his "spread," which results in profits
to him in dealing for his own account, is determined by him and subject only to
relatively flexible regulation by the N.A.S.D. See Art. I, §§ 1 and 4 of the N.A.S.D.
Rules of Fair Practice, CCH N.A.S.D. [MANUAL] 5 2154.§4 merely requires members
to buy or sell for their own account at prices which are "fair, taking into consider-
ation ... market conditions with respect to such security at the time of the transac-
tion, the expense involved, and the fact that [they are] entitled to a profit ... "
which policy has been interpreted as requiring a reasonable relation between the
dealer's price and the current market price, which may, if he is the only dealer in the
security, be determined by him. The 5% mark-up guide-line may fluctuate depending
on the type and price of the security, its availability, the size of the transaction and
services furnished by the dealer. Id. at 2056-57. Enforcement of these rules has
necessarily been limited to extreme cases. See, e.g., Merritt, Vickers, Inc. v. S.E.C., 352
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duty by a stock exchange specialist, an over-the-counter market
maker or a stock transfer agent. Furthermore, it is plain that insti-
tutional brokers would be well-advised to treat confidentially their
information as to the entry or exit of mutual funds or other insti-
tutional investors or block traders into or from the market.15 2
4. A Proposed Definition
To summarize the foregoing the following definition is pro-
posed.
Information is material when:
(1) It concerns an essentially extraordinary development as
to the corporation or the market for its security which
(2) can, if disclosed, reasonably be expected to affect, within
a short period of time, the market price of the security in ex-
cess of the normal price fluctuation of such security. Such an
effect can reasonably be expected to occur if the particular de-
velopment is of a magnitude, discounted
(a) in the case of an incomplete development, by its
improbability of occurrence;
(b) by any lack of specificity of the information; and
(c) by the degree of its unreliability, sufficiently great,
in the context of other publicly available information about the
company or its securities, to prompt a reasonable, if speculative,
investor to take immediate action.
C. Tipping
It has already been suggested that those who acquire material
undisclosed information for no legitimate corporate purpose or not
by virtue of their relationship to a company, the so-called "outer
insiders" or "tippees,"' 53 should be equally restricted by Rule lOb-5
.2d 293(2d Cir. 1965) af'g, S.E.A. Release No. 7409 (Sept. 2, 1964) (N.A.S.D. disci-
plinary action upheld); In re J. A. Winston & Co., Inc., S.E.A. Release No. 7334 (June
5, 1964) (same). Consistent enforcement of a "spread" limitation would considerably
diminish a dealer's opportunity to profit by inside market information but a less re-
strictive alternative would be to require the publication in the "pink sheets" of daily
volume and price fluctuation in over-the-counter securities. This could enable non-
market-making dealers and others aware of the changed demand for, or supply of, a
security to negotiate prices with market-makers.
152 This problem is diminished with respect to listed securities, the trading vol-
ume of which is available (except for "third" or "fourth" market transactions) and
may offer some basis for determining whether block traders are in the market for the
stock. It is, however, impossible to ascertain from volume alone whether an institution
is buying or selling a large block, and unless such programs are gradual and geared
to market supply or demand, knowledge thereof may still be material.
153 The classification of insiders as either "inner" or "outer," the latter being
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from taking investment action or tipping as "inner insiders," except
to that extent that their distance5 4 from the central source of data
indicates its non-materiality, because such conduct by either form of
insider is conducive to "inherent unfairness."'15 Another reason for
tippee liability is the second major objective underlying Rule lOb-5
as applied in civil actions, that of compensating those injured by the
misuse of inside information. Promoting the flow of accurate and
reliable information, as well as the achievement of this deterrent ob-
jective would also suggest holding tippees liable as "tippors" for
aggravating these problems by continuing to pass such information.
Since in many cases the tippee will have received the only
profit from the transaction, tippees would seem the most appro-
priate parties to make compensation. 156 However, in order to pre-
serve the necessary deterrent effect of a proscription against tipping,
tippors should also be held liable for damages as joint tortfeasors
with their tippees. 157 Although section 10 of the Exchange Act
makes no express provision for treating such parties as joint tort-
feasors, this should be no obstacle to the courts for neither did the
section provide for private rights of action to redress violations of
section 10(b) and the rules promulgated thereunder; moreover, joint
and several liability finds ample precedent in the law of torts which
Rule 10b-5 so closely resembles in many respects, 58 and in the col-
lective liabilities of controlling and controlled persons under section
20(a) of the Exchange Act.'5 9
The foregoing discussion has, of course, assumed the material-
ity of the information acted upon by tippees. Another limitation on
tippee liability suggested by the opinion in Texas Gulf is a require-
essentially tippees, has been borrowed from Professor Bromberg. See PLI TRANSCRsar,
supra note 87, at 213, 215.
154 See id. at 208-10, 214.
155 See text accompanying notes 81-91, supra. See also 82 HAav. L. Rav. 938, 942
(1969).
156 See id. at 943.
15 But see id., finding this result unlikely under present law.
158 For example, the Rule lOb-5 concepts of standards of conduct to be enforced
by deterrent rules, proximate causation and the absence of a privity requirement
have all been borrowed, in some form, from the law of torts.
159 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). This provision reads as follows:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also
be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly in-
duce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
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ment that "they acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the
material information was undisclosed.. ."160 However, to the extent
that a potential tippee can reasonably be expected to ascertain from
a broker or otherwise whether information is in fact public, the
"constructive knowledge" caveat would seem to eliminate this pos-
sible defense and restrict its applicability to the relatively rare situa-
tion in which the tippee is misinformed by his broker or by his
informant. Conversely, this standard of, in effect, due diligence
should, consistently with the Texas Gulf disposition of the insiders'
claims of good faith, be applied to render a tippor liable for passing
material inside information unless he reasonably believes that it will
not be misused, i.e., acted upon or unnecessarily transmitted, by the
recipient of the information.161 It would seem, however, that such a
belief would rarely, if ever, be reasonable when information is com-
municated for no corporate or other legitimate purpose.16 2
One further point merits discussion in the context of the tip-
ping. Specificity and reliability are, as noted earlier, pertinent fac-
tors in determining materiality. In many tipping situations, however,
the relationship between the tippor and tippee is so close that the
tippee has sufficient knowledge as to the tippor and his source that
reliability may be assumed and specificity not required.
For example, although Darke, the TGS geologist held liable
for tipping, had been proven only to have generally recommended
TGS stock, the court, with the inferential aid of the unusually spec-
ulative and large tippee transactions and their timing, found li-
ability. 63 Two members of the majority preferred to remand for a
finding
160 Id. at 853. The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf has already treated such trading
by relatives or nominees of "inner" insiders as the latter's violation and, presumably,
responsibility in the event of damages. See 401 F.2d at 841 n.4, 856 n.23; see also Brom-
berg PLI TRANsciFr, supra note 87, at 230. Such liability appears to be grounded
on Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b), which prohibits one from
using another person to perform an act prohibited under the Exchange Act or any
rule or regulation thereunder."
161 See Bromberg, PLI TRANscwrT, supra note 87, at 214-15.
162 To restrict the transmittal of material undisclosed information to those who
have a "need to know" would be more consistent with the deterrent purpose of the
Rule in view of the great temptations placed on recipients of such information and
the difficulties in policing remote tippees. See, e.g., the Statement of Policy adopted by
Merrill Lynch in settlement with the S.E.C. requiring all non-public information to
be clearly identified as such with the instruction that it "is to be used by the recipient
solely for the purpose of carrying out his responsibilities . . .and not to be disclosed
orally or in writing for any other purpose." Merrill Lynch, supra note 86, at 83,351.
163 401 F.2d at 852.
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as to whether, Darke, expressly or by implication, transmitted
to these outsiders any indication of the extremely favorable re-
sults of the drilling operation in which he was engaged . . .164
(Emphasis supplied.)
The significance of this statement is twofold: First, the revelation
of some "indication," however undetailed, of the favorable drilling
progress was apparently considered sufficient, at least by Judges
Waterman and Anderson, to predicate a tipping violation by Darke,
an "inner insider," in the same vein that transactional violations by
Huntington and Kline, also "inner insiders," were found on the ba-
sis of their general knowledge of the drilling. In a tipping context,
as in a transactional setting, the theoretical justification for such a
standard is that actions by inner insiders are both more reliable and
revealing to others, their tippees, and more likely to be based on a
reliable understanding of the material development. Second, and re-
lated, is the reference to tipping "by implication." The majority in
Texas Gulf could reasonably have assumed, and probably did, that
Darke's tippees, apparently good friends of his, had previously
learned at least of the nature of his work as a geologist and his
whereabouts and could easily have inferred from his reactions to
the subject of TGS and from his general recommendation that
something extremely good was happening; and, of course, a good
friend would not give his tippees a "bum steer" or suggest to those
he knew to be irregular investors that they take substantial risks.1 65
Thus, although such inferences, and the consequential devaluation
of the specificity and reliability factors, may not be justified where
the tippor-tippee relationship is distant, they seem quite justifiable
in the Texas Gulf situation and in many normal tipping contexts.
D. Stock Options
The portion of the Texas Gulf opinion dealing with the issu-
ance of stock options is of considerable theoretical importance since
the rationale adopted, i.e., Rule lOb-5 applies to protect the unin-
formed issuer (and presumably its constituent shareholders), as well
as the investing public, from the inherent unfairness attendant in
the issuance to insiders of securities for less than their intended con-
sideration is a significant expansion of prior authority and comes
164 Id. at 852-53 n.16.
165 Tippees, of course, bear the risk of loss if the tips prove inaccurate. See, e.g.,
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,282 (S.D.Tex. No. 66-H-596,
Feb. 27, 1968).
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close to effecting internal corporate affairs traditionally regulated
only by state law.160
As previously observed, the basic difference between the posi-
tions of the Texas Gulf majority and the dissenters is that the latter
would, on the facts presented, have permitted the insiders to accept
options so long as they did not exercise them until after disclosure,167
a proposal which the majority would reserve only for situations in
which corporate security forbade both any communication to the
option committee and rejection of the options. 168 The rule adopted
by the majority for the usual case where, as in Texas Gulf, no such
dilemma was demonstrated, required members of "top management"
either to disclose their material non-public information to the issuing
body or to reject the options.169 Optionees below the level of "top
management" were excused from any obligation since they could
reasonably assume that their superiors had made disclosure.170
On the facts of the case, this resolution was undoubtedly cor-
rect. As Judge Friendly astutely observed, there is no reason why,
in the normal case, members of option committees who are com-
monly directors cannot be entrusted with information as to extra-
ordinary corporate developments or, at least, with the advice that
the issuance of options was then inappropriate.' 7 ' In the abnormal
case, however, the majority's alternative bears considerable merit 72
166 The reasoning adopted by the majority would also seem applicable to the
issuance of convertible debt or equity security, as well as warrants, whenever the
conversion ratio or exercise price is set by reference to the actual or presumed
market value at the time of issuance. See Sargent, PLI TRANscmurr, supra note 87, at
326-27 (by implication).
167 401 F.2d at 877-78.
168 Id. at 857 n.24.
169 Id. at 856-57.
170 Id. at 857.
171 Id. at 865.
172 This alternative proposal has been unduly criticized for permitting insiders
to gain windfalls upon post-disclosure ratification. See Sargent, PIU TPArscsuzr,
supra note 87, at 249-55. However, it should be noted that such ratification need not
be automatic as members of the ratifying committee would be subject to shareholder
derivative suits for corporate waste if their decision to grant the windfall to the in-
siders were not the product of reasonable business judgment. Also, as noted by Mr.
Sargent, once disclosure has been made, the issuer has no longer been deceived, and
the profits received by insiders are not unfairly kept if the corporation consents. Id.
at 250. Moreover, since qualified options must be issued at a price not less than fair
market value on the date of issuance in order to receive preferential tax treatment
[see INT. RXV. CODE of 1954, § 422(b)(4)] and pursuant to a plan which so specifies [see
id., § 422(b)(a)], rescission rather than ratification may be desirable if the Internal
Revenue Service should determine that fair market value should reflect undisclosed
favorable developments.
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for it is not inconceivable that even outside directors on an option
committee may have sufficient general knowledge of significant po-
tential developments as to be able to interpret even general instruc-
tions to postpone issuance as clearly favorable or unfavorable; and,
if they additionally have either a personal interest in the develop-
ment or financial problems, the temptation to breach the corporate
confidence may be great. In any event, however, Judge Friendly is
quite correct in implying that option committees, as well as boards
of directors, should be staffed with persons who can be trusted with
confidential information. And, in some cases at least, the rejection
of options need not necessarily be construed as a favorable sign, for
the prospective optionees may be expecting a market decline and
prefer to await issuance at a lower price without jeopardizing their
tax position. 173
There may also be some question as to the status of a lower
level employee who receives options while in possession of material
inside information. Where he can reasonably assume disclosure has
been made, as the majority thought was the case in Texas Gulf, he
clearly should not be responsible for deciding whether and to what
extent to disclose or how to reject the options. If, however, he knows
or has reason to believe that disclosure has not been made, no good
reason appears why he should not be required to abstain, as are
"outer insiders" in non-option cases who are unable to disclose, and
reject the options, citing, if necessary, personal reasons; at the very
least, he should not be permitted to exercise the options prior to a
post-disclosure ratification. While members of "top management"
may be ultimately responsible to the corporation for his windfall
under several theories, 17 4 he need not take advantage of such a
windfall at their expense or that of the corporation.
Further in this connection, it is interesting to note that when
the material inside information concealed from an option commit-
173 Under INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 422(b)(5), a qualified stock option (receiving
preferential tax treatment) is not exercisable while there remains outstanding any pre-
viously granted qualified or restricted option. Thus, an optionee would first have
to exercise prior options at a higher price before he could benefit from the lower
option price later awarded him.
174 At 401 F.2d at 865, Judge Friendly suggested the possibility that top manage-
ment be held liable for damages suffered as a result of the untimely issuance of
options. See also text at notes supra, suggesting tippors' liability as controlling persons
under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, a theory which would seem equally appli-
cable where top management controls the non-disclosure and acceptance of options
by lower-level employees.
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tee is adverse to the company or its securities,175 the issuance of op-
tions, may, in a rare case, also be injurious. In view of the tax disad-
vantages to uninformed recipients of qualified options with respect to
subsequently acquired options exercisable at a lower price, such op-
tionees may be damaged by accepting options from an issuer with
material inside information which, if they knew the adverse infor-
mation, they would reject in anticipation of later receiving more fa-
vorably priced options. In this manner, the issuer may profit by ul-
timately selling its underlying securities at a price higher than would
otherwise be obtained, and this seems inherently unfair. 76
Conversely, if the issuer is uninformed and the optionees are
insiders, their rejection of options because of their adverse inside
information seems inequitable vis-4-vis both uninformed optionees
who accept and the issuer. If all of the optionees are knowledgeable,
their rejection of the options theoretically causes no injury to the
corporation since the acceptance or rejection by employees is dis-
cretionary. Nevertheless, the issuer may, in fact, have been caused
to issue securities at a lower price than would otherwise have been
obtained were it not for the optionees' inside information, and this
seems equally unfair as the granting of options by a knowledgeable
issuer to uninformed employees who would not accept if they too
were informed.
Finally, it should be noted that Rule lOb-5 restricts insiders
only from accepting but not from exercising options or, for that mat-
ter, exercising warrants or converting other securities, issued to them
when they had no material undisclosed information.1* The ratio-
nale for this proposition is that since the exercise price or conversa-
tion rate was set at a time when they were on equal footing with
other security holders and the issuer. They cannot profit unfairly
by subsequently exercising or converting, itself a discretionary act.
In the unusual case where the optionee, warrantholder, or holder of
a convertible security would clearly not have exercised or converted
within the period prescribed therefor but for his material inside
information,'1 8 it might seem unfair to the issuer to permit such
175 This situation is highly unlikely where knowledgeable members of top man-
agement are slated to receive qualified options for the reasons stated in note 173
supra, and accompanying text.
176 This would also seem to violate sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of
1933 if the options are registered; if unregistered, section 5 might be violated since
the issuance of options under such circumstances might not qualify for the exemp-
tion from registration provided by section 4(2).
177 See Schwartz, i'LI TRANscRiur, supra note 87, at 262.
178 This would be the case where, e.g., the market price was lower than the
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investment action for it would not, arguably, otherwise have had
to issue the underlying security at a price below the fair market
value to be reflected upon disclosure. However, this analysis ig-
nores the absolute right of such security holders to base their de-
cision to exercise or convert on all information affecting the value
of their privilege and the underlying security, whether or not such
information is available to the issuer, who could not modify or
nullify the privilege, or to the investing public generally.
E. Effective Public Disclosure
Two further problems raised or suggested in the Texas Gulf
context are how and when does disclosure become effective so as to
permit insider activity. Although the court did not undertake a de-
finitive resolution of either issue, it did suggest certain valuable
guidelines.
In rejecting the claims of Coates and Crawford who had placed
orders before the formal TGS announcement of its ore strike was
issued and disseminated, the majority first observed that insiders
will not be permitted to "beat the news" by even initiating invest-
ment action, i.e., placing orders before disclosure was effective1 79
The rationale for this position would seem also to apply to any other
pre-disclosure action which would give insiders an investment advan-
tage over other uninformed investors. 80
This reasoning was also extended to prohibit the placement of
orders immediately after disclosure "where the news is of a sort
which is not readily translatable into investment action,"' 81 in order
to deprive insiders of any unfair advantage gained from their ad-
vance knowledge of material developments. Having set the mini-
mum criterion where news may be instantaneously acted upon 82 as
its reasonably anticipated, if not actual,'8 3 appearance over the Dow-
exercise price but the optionee had inside information which, when disclosed, could
reasonably be expected to increase the market price beyond the exercise price. See
Fleischer, PLI TRANsciRr, supra note 87, at 262.
179 401 F.2d at 853 n.17.
180 Judge Waterman's opinion declared that "insiders may not take advantage of
their advance opportunity to evaluate the information . . . " id. at 854 n.18, and
that disclosure must be effective "[b]efore insiders may act upon material informa-
tion ... ," id. at 854 (emphasis supplied).
181 Id. at 854 n.18.
182 A major ore strike, new product discovery, sharp earnings change, substantial
dividend change or tender offer migfit fall within this category as such events would
commonly have a decisive reaction upon the reasonable investor.
183 See note 203, infra.
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Jones "broad tape," the court wisely deferred more precise deter-
minations for Commission rule-making.8 4
In further rejecting the TGS insiders' contention that the wide-
spread circulation of rumors of a major strike coupled with Cana-
dian dissemination of the information constituted effective disclo-
sure,18 5 the court made it clear that dissemination must be made in
a manner reasonably calculated to reach all investors likely to be
interested in the company's securities. Thus, for a foreign company
whose securities are traded on an American exchange or widely
traded within the United States, 8 6 dissemination through national'8 7
United States financial media would seem required. 88 Moreover, al-
184 401 F.2do at 854 n.18. The Commission is reportedly considering the estab-
lishment of a "reasonable waiting period" of twenty-four hours as a minimum which
insiders must wait. Bromberg, PLI TRANsciPT, supra note 87, at 237. Though
such a rule would provide some predictability for insiders without surrendering
the vagueness deemed desirable by the Commission as a deterrent measure, see 82
HARV. L. Rxv. 938, 945-46 (1969), it would seem fairer to insiders at least to include
a listing of events which may be acted upon immediately or within a shorter period
of time after appearance over the "broad tape" or in a financial newspaper of
general circulation, e.g., the Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Barron's and
The National Observer have also been suggested as having sufficiently wide circulation
among investors to qualify as a primary outlet. Sommer, PLI TRaIscriPr, supra
note 87, at 57. With respect to the waiting period referred to above, a rule requiring
abstention only until the appearance of news in morning newspapers of sufficient
circulation would seem fairer to insiders than any arbitrary period of time, though
outsiders who watch the tape could still move more swiftly than the restricted
insiders. However, the best solution to this inequity would be to require disclosure
after the close of trading in the relevant market so that tape-watching outsiders will
be unable to act until the next trading session, by which time the news will have
been published and insiders liberated.
185 401 F.2d at 853. The court's conclusion on this point was also influenced by
TGS's promise in its prior pessimistic release to fully disclose further developments
by means of such formal releases to the American investing public.
186 In this connection, Commisison Rule 12g3-2(a)(1) exempting from registration
under the Exchange Act classes of securities of foreign issuers having fewer than 300
American shareholders may serve as a temporary guideline in determining when
United States dissemination is required before insiders may trade in the security
in United States markets.
187 The New York Stock Exchange requires listed companies to release such infor-
mation simultaneously to Dow Jones & Company, Inc. and to one or more of the
national newswire services, i.e., Associated Press, Reuters or United Press International,
as well as to newspapers of general circulation which regularly publish financial news.
Also suggested is dissemination to newspapers in cities where the company has
principal offices or installations. NEw YORK STOCK EXCHMAGE COBIPANY MANUAL, Section
A 2, Part II, A-24. (July 1968). In addition, publication in newspapers in areas where
large numbers of stockholders reside would also seem appropriate.
188 Of course, if the item is rejected by the national media of general circulation,
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though an exclusive release to a trade publication of general circu-
lation among security analysts specializing in the area might, ar-
guably, suffice in the case of a development which could have
investment significance only to such experts, this sort of develop-
ment would also seem to require insiders to abide by an additional
"waiting period" for analysis and evaluation by outsiders. Here, too,
the safest means of disclosure would be dissemination to financial
media of general circulation. Even in the case of small public com-
panies having primarily local investor attraction such broad disclo-
sure would be advisable, for a company and its insiders would seem
remiss in not making significant news available either to non-stock-
holders8 0 or to distant stockholders.
Another major problem not definitively resolved by Texas
Gulf is the question of when must a company effect public disclo-
sure. Although the majority here deferred to a corporation's "busi-
ness judgment" and Commission and exchange requirements,19 0 it
would seem that public corporations or their managers must bear
some responsibility for accurately divulging material developments
as soon as legitimate corporate reasons for non-disclosure' 91 have
ceased to exist. This burden should certainly be imposed if the con-
sequence of non-disclosure is, beyond unjustified injury and gain to
ignorant shareholders alike, insider and tippee trading.19 2 Liability
such rejection might constitute some objective evidence, either of non-materiality or
that the company does not command national financial attention. See note 90, supra,
and text accompanying note 196, infra.
189 See note 82, supra.
190 401 F.2d at 850 n.12. The Commission's periodic reporting requirements are
contained in Forms 8-K and 10-K and do not compel immediate disclosure. See 2 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP'. 31,003, 31,103. The New York Stock Exchange currently requires
immediate release of news relating to, inter alia, earnings reports, dividend announce-
ments, acquisitions, mergers, tender offers, stock splits, management changes, new
products, contract awards, expansion plans and discoveries. Naw YORK SToc Ex-
CHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL, supra note 187, at A-22.
191 Such reasons would include, e.g., TGS's desire to acquire options on the re-
maining portions of the Kidd property as well as a tendering or acquiring company's
desire to purchase as many shares of the target company as possible at the lowest
possible price and without organized resistance.
192 In this regard, the New York Stock Exchange has suggested immediate public
release of news, disclosure of which might otherwise be deemed premature, (1) when
private disclosure is made to persons other than top management and their individual
confidential advisors, at which point the maintenance of security is too difficult, or
(2) if unusual market activity or a substantial price change in the company's stock
should appear, which would signify insider or tippee trading. Nav YoRK STOC
EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 187, at A-19. Listed companies are urged to
alert the stock watch department of the Exchange. Id. at A-23. Unlisted companies
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in these circumstances might properly be grounded on the deterrent
policy of Rule lOb-5 since the company and its managers can con-
trol those to whom such information is divulged,193 as well as the
timing of public disclosure.
Nor does an "open door" policy on the part of public com-
panies satisfy their disclosure obligation to the public. Although the
New York Stock Exchange appears to condone the divulgence of in-
formation to outsiders if it would willingly reveal it to other in-
quirers or the press, such willingness, however admirable, is insuffi-
cient.194 All members of the investing public, who are entitled to
"equal access" to material information, are unfortunately not in a
position to initiate inquiries of all companies that may interest
them. Moreover, however well-intentioned management may be, it
would be totally impractical for knowledgeable and responsible
members of management to be available to play, in effect, "Twenty
Questions," with the probable result that only friends or profes-
sionals would receive the news." 5 If management is willing to re-
lease the matter to the press, there is no reason why it should not do
so and save the public the intolerable burden of seeking out the
information. Of course, if the financial media view the item as non-
material and other relevant sources of dissemination are unavailable
for similar reasons, management may safely rely on its "open-door"
policy, but in the hopefully rare case where such rejection may not
reasonably be viewed as based upon non-materiality, paid advertise-
ments and/or letters to the investment community might merit some
consideration as alternative vehicles of disclosure. 96
F. Insiders' Defenses
This issue raises the question of the standard of conduct to be
required of insiders to avoid violation of Rule l0b-5. There was no
substantial disagreement among the members of the Second Circuit
in Texas Gulf from the clear abandonment of the old scienter re-
should, it is submitted, report suspected insider activity to the Commission and/or
the N.A.S.D.
193 The internal security measures adopted by some companies include requiring
employees to pledge under oath not to use or divulge material inside information. See
Wiesen, supra note 95, at 214 and the examples cited therein. Such a procedure may
not provide an effective indemnity for the corporation in respect of the misconduct
of financially irresponsible employees, but it is highly useful as a deterrent to such
action.
194 Nmv YoRa SrocK ExcHANGE CoMPANY MANuAL, supra note 187, at p. A-20.
195 Wiesen, supra note 95, at 213.
196 See notes 185 and 188, supra.
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quirement0 7 as inconsistent with the- deterrent objective of the
Rule. Thus, the unreasonableness of the claims of certain TGS in-
siders that they, in good faith, believed the news of the ore strike
was public was held to bar any defense on this ground. 98 A similar
standard of reasonableness was implied in the court's dictum re-
garding the liability of tippees.1 9
In this context, it is feasible to determine the reasonableness of
the conduct of each individual, whether insider or tippee, by ref-
erence to the conduct of the class of persons similarly situated with-
out diminishing the force of either the deterrence or compensa-
tion 20 objectives of the Rule.201 Thus, if a corporate manager were
to give a confidential report in an unsealed envelope, or in no
envelope at all, to a messenger with no instructions as to its nature
and without taking any security precautions and the messenger
traded or tipped, the manager would have acted unreasonably even
if the messenger, perhaps because he had no access to a broker or
other means of determining the inside nature of the information,
had not. If, however, the recipient of the report were company coun-
sel, no such instructions would be necessary from the manager be-
cause he could reasonably assume the other's knowledge of the
nature of the information and the restriction on its use and the re-
cipient would be acting unreasonably in using or passing the infor-
mation. Similarly, the tippor's knowledge of the tippee's likelihood
to yield to temptation may be considered in determining the rea-
sonableness of his conduct; and, of course, the tippee's knowledge of
the tippor's connection with the company and of the existence of
legitimate purposes for the transmittal of the information may bear
upon, not only the reliability components of materiality, but also,
the tippee's responsibility for ultimate misuse of the information.
It has, however, been suggested that tippees as a class should
be held to a lower standard of care than other insiders and that they
might be permitted to defend on the ground that the information
acted upon had already been disclosed when it appeared in rumors
and other news stories, as in Texas Gulf.202 Justification for this view
107 See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951).
108 401 F.2d at 854-56.
10 See id., at 853.
200 See text accompanying note 120, supra.
201 If tippors and tippees are held jointly and severally liable, as has been sug-
gested supra, problems of apportioning liability between the two on the basis of
relative culpability are likely to arise.
202 Bromberg, PU TRA~sasr, supra note 87, at 213, 236.
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can only derive from some inherent difference in the relative ca-
pacities of insiders and tippees to ascertain when information has
become publicly available. However, while insiders may have more
precise knowledge as to the timing and means of public disclosure,
tippees may be equally capable of checking the financial sections of
relevant publications, obtaining security reports and, if appropriate,
asking brokers to watch the "broad tape" on their behalf for any
news relating to the company. Since the time of anticipated, if not
actual, appearance of the news in the financial media is, under
Texas Gulf,20 3 the minimum prerequisite to both insider and tippee
investment action, there is no apparent basis for such a general
distinction, though an individual's capacity to determine whether
information is publicly available should be a major component of a
defense based on reasonable care.
It has also been suggested that insiders should be held to a lesser
standard of care in non-privity cases-private actions for damages by
plaintiffs not transactionally related to the insider-because liability
could far exceed the insider's potential profits and the reasonable
conduct standard is not required for deterrence of acts done in good
faith.20 4 These bases do not, it is submitted, justify the substantial
diminution in deterrent force which is likely to result in view of the
difficulties either of negating good faith or establishing bad faith,
willful or reckless misconduct.
Although the private remedies to be awarded in non-privity
cases such as Texas Gulf have not yet been determined, it would
seem that the fear of imposition of a gigantic liability upon an indi-
vidual insider is premature, if not unlikely. A plaintiff would still
be required to prove that he was injured as a direct result of the in-
sider's trading activity and this would seem impossible if, as in Texas
Gulf, the company had no affirmative duty to disclose and the plain-
tiffs had no right to know. More than likely, an uninformed investor
who sold his TGS stock before disclosure of the ore strike profited
203 See 401 F.2d at 854. Although the court took the trouble to demonstrate that
Coates could not reasonably have expected the TGS release to appear over the 'broad
tape' when he placed his order, it would seem that the duty of reasonable care would
normally require abstention until the actual appearance of the news to the extent
that the burden of awaiting and verifying such appearance would not be unrea-
sonable under the circumstances.
204 Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind
in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 441-42 (1968). Professor
Ruder is willing to presume good faith on the part of insiders but this presumption
has been forcefully contradicted. See Barnhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen, 39 H. v.
Bus. Rzv. 6 (1961).
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by the presence of the insiders in the market, for their buying may
have enabled the sellers to receive a higher price. The buyers during
that period may have been injured by being required to pay a higher
price, but such injury would be so slight that a division of the in-
siders' profits among all such buyers would be sufficient compensa-
tion. And if the company were obligated to disclose, it or its man-
agers, rather than insiders would be the proper defendants. With
respect to the second claimed justification, it is sufficient to note that
a good faith standard would not encourage insiders to exercise care
in determining whether the material information has been effectively
disclosed, and since only "inner insiders" can effect disclosure, such
encouragement is essential.
Another possible defense available to an insider but not pre-
sented in Texas Gulf is that he did not "act" on his material inside
information because he engaged in no transaction in the security
concerned.205 However, it should be noted that the underlying pol-
icy of Rule lOb-5 as construed in Texas Gulf is to prevent insiders
from taking any unfair advantage of their inside knowledge.20 6 The
applicability of this policy to non-transactional violations is further
supported by the court's inclusion within the concept of investment
"activity" not only buying and selling, but also "holding" a secu-
rity.20 7 In this light, the prohibition against insider "action" must be
broadly construed to preclude insiders from, e.g., foregoing a trans-
action which they would clearly have engaged in but for their in-
side information.
In the case of brokers or security analysts, their receipt of mate-
rial undisclosed information should not permit them to withhold a
previously determined contrary recommendation or to withdraw a
pre-existing one. Conversely, the receipt of material inside informa-
tion which confirms a prior investment decision or recommendation
should not per se preclude the consummation of such a predeter-
mined course of action, though any action which would be extraor-
dinary for the investor, broker or advisor would strengthen the per-
205 This issue bears certain similarities to the "purchase or sale" requirement
imposed upon Rule lOb-5 plaintiffs to establish their standing to sue. This require-
ment appears to be in the process of gradual erosion by the courts, Electronic Spe-
cialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., CCH. FEIn. SEC. L. REP. 92, 323 (S.D.N.Y.,
Dec. 19, 1968), as was the privity requirement, see the opinion of the District Court
in Texas Gulf 258 F. Supp. at 277.
200 See 401 F.2d at 854 n.18.
207 Id. at 849: ". . . material facts include . . . those which may affect the
desire of investors to buy, sell or hold the company's securities." (Emphasis supplied.)
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missible inference that he, as a reasonable investor, was influenced
by, and acted upon, the material information. Thus, it would be
advisable for brokers, investors, advisors and others who not infre-
quently receive material inside information to maintain detailed
chronological records of both their investment decisions and their
receipt of such information. After such receipt, no investment action
should be taken which is not dearly warranted by reference to inde-
pendent factors.
G. Corporate Liability for Inaccurate Disclosures
A highly significant section of the Texas Gulf opinion for pub-
lic corporations is that dealing with TGS's potential liability for
having issued a misleading press release. Essentially, it was held that
a report could, but need not, be enjoined under Rule lOb-5(2) if it
was materially misleading to the reasonable investor, i.e., it led him
to believe the material facts to be other than they were at the time,
and the issuance of the report in its misleading form resulted from
negligence. 2 8 The absence of proof of any actual or anticipated se-
curities transaction was held not to bar the application of the Rule
so long as the report was made "in a manner reasonably calculated
to influence the investing public, e.g., by means of the financial me-
dia." 209
The general regulatory policy of discouraging the deception of
investors to the maximum extent possible certainly explains, if it
does not justify, the court's expansive reading of the "in connection
with" phrase of the Rule, for the investor may be as easily deceived
by a negligently prepared misleading report as by one conceived
with "malice aforethought" and proof of a wrongful motive on the
part of the issuer would be virtually impossible absent an actual
208 401 F.2d at 863.
209 Id. at 862. This language would presumably exclude from the aegis of Rule
lOb-5 statements made in commercials and advertisements not reasonably likely to
influence the investing public. Statements made to certain newspapers which regu-
larly publish financial news and to certain periodicals widely circulated among in-
vestors generally, e.g., Barron's, Time, Business Week, Fortune, Forbes, Newsweek, and
U.S. News & World Report, might a fortiori, be classified within the financial media,
though any such classification should more appropriately be developed by the Com-
mission. It should, however, be noted that investors are so broadly dispersed through-
out the reading and viewing public that any statement which would be material to
a reasonable investor is likely to result in his reliance, virtually irrespective of the
medium of its dissemination. Therefore, the policy of Rule lOb-5 would best be served
by proscribing all false or misleading statements which would be material to the rea-
sonable investor by inducing him to take immediate investment action.
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securities transaction.210 Moreover, aside from the deterrent objec-
tive, the regulatory interest in maintaining honest markets211 based
on accurate information suggests the necessity for injunctive relief
to require withdrawal or correction of false or misleading statements,
irrespective of whether the issuer acted reasonably or unreasonably.
There is no reason in policy why a misleading release issued under
pressure, as was claimed in Texas Gulf, and perhaps without negli-
gence on the part of the issuer, should be permitted to stand uncor-
rected and continue to deceive the investing public. This purpose
would not, of course, require injunctive relief after the true facts
had been disclosed, as in Texas Gulf, and an issuer's reasonableness
should still preclude its liability for damages and diminish the neces-
sity of enjoining future misstatements.
In view of the solid authority for the general proposition that
"[i]t is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to
establish all the elements required 212 in a suit for monetary dam-
ages,"2 13 the Texas Gulf majority limited its application of a negli-
gence standard in Rule lOb-5(2) situations to equitable actions for
injunctive relief.214 This limitation was obviously a compromise for
the potential adoption of this standard in damage actions against
corporate issuers of misleading statements apparently stirred con-
siderable controversy among the members of the Second Circuit in
Texas Gulf. However, even this slight expansion of the Rule to
cover situations not involving actual or proposed securities transac-
tions or manipulations by a defendant seems inconsistent with the
language of section 10 (b), Rule 10b-5 and the Commission's inten-
tion in its promulgation, in light of its failure to apply the Rule to
non-transactional cases in the 23 years prior to its filing of the Texas
Gulf complaint.215 It is submitted that, while the general policies
210 Id. at 860-61.
211 See H.R. REP. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1939).
212 Another of the elements required in damage actions, reliance, has essentially
been preserved in equitable actions by the court's construction of the "in connection
with" language as contingent upon the issuance of a corporate statement in a manner
reasonably likely to cause investors generally to rely thereon. Retention of this
element in the equitable context is necessary if the Congressional language is to be
given any meaning and corporations are to be permitted to conduct a business sep-
arately from their issuance and promotion of securities. See note 207, supra.
213 401 F.2d 863, quoting from SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
214 401 F.2d at 863. The question was again raised and avoided in Heit v. Weitzen,
402 F.2d 909, 913-14 (2d Cir. 1968).
215 See, e.g., In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); Cady,
Roberts, supra note 77.
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implicit in the Exchange Act and its regulatory scheme may require
a still greater expansion of the scope of the Rule in the area of
inaccurate disclosures, the needs of the investment community would
best be served by an official congressional and/or Commission re-
formulation of such policies promulgated after full employment of
their respective modes of investigative expertise.
The possible constitutional problems posed in penalizing state-
ments by reference to vague or hitherto unknown standards are suf-
ficiently serious to require consideration, even if it be assumed that
Congress and the Commission have the power to impose severe penal-
ties for negligent misstatements. 216 Unfortunately, the consequences
flowing from the mere determination that a corporation has violated
Rule l0b-52l? are extremely grave in terms of the reaction of the in-
vesting public, as well as that of the Commission in future dealings.
Such penalties should not be imposed in the case of good faith, though
negligent, disclosure and certainly not when misstatements result
from a non-negligent failure to comply with ambiguous or previously
inarticulated guidelines. Nevertheless, the laudatory aim of protecting
the investing public requires that the Commission have the authority
to compel the correction (and the proper dissemination of such cor-
rection) of false or misleading statements, irrespective of the reasons
for their deficiencies.
This dilemma is, however, more apparent than real. It should
not be an insurmountable task for Congress and/or the Commission
to re-examine this area of securities regulation and devise both more
precise guidelines for disclosure and a procedural framework which
would empower the Commission to seek a judicial determination of
the materially false or misleading nature of corporate statements and,
if necessary, their correction, while simultaneously removing the
unnecessary stigma of fraud from disclosure unless the circumstances
warrant the employment of Rule lOb-5 in its present form.
In contrast to the Texas Gulf majority, Judge Friendly was not
content to leave the spectre of monetary liability for negligent mis-
statements for future resolution. He urged that more than negli-
gence should be required in damage cases because a corporation's
216 This is apparently one of the issues raised by TGS in its application to the
Supreme Court. See Wall St. Journal, Sep. 24, 1968, at 4, col. 1; see also, Wall St.
Journal, Jan. 31, 1969, at 31, col. 2.
217 Rule lOb-5 is widely viewed as an 'antifraud' provision designed to deal with
manipulative practices and was apparently so intended by the Commission at the time
of its formulation. See S.EA. Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). 401 F.2d at 913-14 (2d
Cir. 1968).
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enormous potential liability for negligent disclosure would neces-
sarily deter corporations from disclosing and the negligence stan-
dard was inconsistent with congressional intention. 218 This view that
some degree of true scienter should be an element of proof in
damage actions has already been approved by some commenta-
tors,219 and, significantly, was apparently shared by a majority of the
Second Circuit.220 It is submitted, however, that both the deterrence
and compensation purposes of Rule 1Ob-5 require the employment
of a negligence standard of conduct in damage actions, which stan-
dard can be implemented without the adverse effects foreseen by
proponents of a scienter requirement.
The first of Judge Friendly's basic difficulties with the negligence
standard, i.e., the fear that corporations confronted with gigantic
liabilities would disclose less, rather than more, as intended by the
Rule, assumes both that such liability will be intolerable and that the
companies concerned must be permitted to choose not to disclose.
This latter assumption is, however, unpersuasive inasmuch as the
courts, the Commission and/or the Exchanges already do or can, as
previously suggested, affirmatively require accurate disclosure of ma-
terial information at precise stages of development, or in the event
of apparent insider activity.221 The validity of the former assumption
is similarly questionable for its underlying premise can be made to
disappear by properly limiting the damages recoverable in such cases
and by placing the onus of recovery on the shoulders of the true mal-
factors, the architects of false or misleading statements 222
Under an appropriate "tort" measure of damages, 223 the aggre-
218 401 F.2d at 867-68.
219 See, e.g., Ruder, supra note 204 at 429-42; 82 HARv. L. Rav. contra, Comment,
Rule 1ob-5: Elements of a Private Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 541, 549 (1968).
220 Judges Kaufman and Anderson concurred in this portion of Judge Friendly's
opinion, 401 F.2d at 869, and so, presumably would the two dissenters.
221 See notes 190, 192, supra, and accompanying text.
222 Although imposition of liability upon the corporate issuer might achieve a
loss-spreading effect by distributing it among shareholders and/or through insurance,
the products liability analogy is inappropriate where, as in the case of negligent or
willful misstatements, fault can be specifically allocated to promote the deterrence
objective and innocent investors require maximum incentives. Members of corporate
management who act with reasonable care will, of course, be fully insurable, see
Comment, Insuring Corporate Executives Against Liability Under Rule lOb-5: First
Principles and Second Thoughts, 63 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 544, (1968), and be eligible for
corporate indemnification since most states limit indemnificaiton only in cases of negli-
gent or willful conduct, see, e.g Sections 4(a) and (b) of the Model Business Corporation
Act, and specifically, DEL. CODE ANN., Title 8, § 145 (1967).
223 Consistent with the tort theory on which Rule lob-5 civil liabiliy is predi-
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gate liability, even in a case like Texas Gulf, would be a small fraction
of the amount anticipated and but a few cents per share; 224 and, of
cated, see Comment, Measurement of Damages in Private Actitns Under Rule 10b-5,
1968 WAsi4. U.L.Q. 165, 167 (1968), damages for material misstatements or omissions
should be limited to those directly attributable to the misconduct upon which a
plaintiff reasonably relied. A plaintiff's out-of-pocket loss, limiting recovery to the
difference between the value given and that received as at the date of the transaction,
has been the most common measure employed. Id. at 175. Thus, in the Texas Gulf
situation, a shareholdler induced to sell his TGS stock by the first pessimistic press
release would not be awarded the per share difference between his sale price and the
subsequent "high" at which the stock traded, but would be limited by the market
price shortly after full disclosure, the actual value of his shares at the time of the
sale. Such a limitation is not inequitable to the plaintiff in depriving him of a later
windfall (recovery of which would, in effect, be tantamount to awarding punitive
damages) because he could have properly earned such subsequently accruing profits
by using his sales proceeds to buy back into the stock or "covering" his potential
loss. Cf. Steinthal v. Cohn, 16 N.Y.2d 767, 262 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1965). Similarly, a buyer
plaintiff could cover his losses by selling upon disclosure. The recent cases adopting
different measures of damages do not contradict this basic principle for they con-
cerned plaintiffs who, because the stock fradulently sold was not publicly traded, could
not so cover their losses by repurchasing. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th
Cir. 1967); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1965);
Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
224 For example, the aggregate potential damages of TGS calculated by Pro-
fessor Ruder was approximately $139 million. Ruder, supra, note 203, at 429. This
figure incorrectly includes all stock sold from November 12, 1963, the date K55-1 was
drilled, until April 16, 1964, when full disclosure was made; it has, however, no-
where been suggested that TGS be liable for any sales prior to its April 12 press
release, and only then because it may have been misleading. In calculating probable
damages under the principles suggested in note 215, supra, the 691,000 shares traded
from April 12 to April 16 must first be adjusted by some deduction from the 126,500
shares sold on April 13 to exclude those shares not sold in reliance upon the April
12 statement because, e.g., the orders had been placed prior to their having read the
pessimistic release or were the product of profit-taking; a similar deduction from the
444,200 shares traded on April 16 must be made to exclude those shares sold after
the TGS announcement appeared on the "broad tape" in the first hour of trading.
Assuming, arguendo, that as many as 75% of the shares sold on April 13 and 16 were
sold in reliance on the April 12 release, and further, that such reliance could
and would be proven by enterprising plaintiffs, only approximately 550,000 shares
are entitled to be included in a calculation of damages. Next, it is noteworthy that,
although the price of TGS stock ranged from 28V to 32 during this period, the
great majority of the sales occurred on April 13, when the low price was 30% and
on April 16, when it was 30/. Thus an average selling price for the potential plain-
tiffs would probably be no less than 293/4. If this is deducted from 33 , an approxi-
mate mean price on April 16, by which time a reasonable investor would have heard
the news of the ore strike and could have regained his position in TGS stock, we
obtain a conservatively high damage estimate of 3 per share, or an aggregate of
approximately $1.825 million. This amounts to only about $.06 for each of the
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course, if application of a different measure of damages would result
in excessive liability, legal reform should be directed to placing a
realistic limitation on damages rather than to lowering the standard
of conduct required to effectuate full and accurate disclosure of ma-
terial information and depriving innocent victims of careless corpo-
rate draftsmen of compensation for their actual and provable injuries.
The inevitable consequences of imposing an obligation of reasonable
care upon management in the disclosure of material information
would be the more diligent conduct of management and the in-
creased utilization of legal services, which can only be considered
desirable.
The second prong of Judge Friendly's argument, i.e., that the
imposition of such liability absent a showing of some wrongful pur-
pose is unwarranted by congressional intention in enacting section
10(b), also appears insufficient to justify denying compensation to
victims of corporate misstatements. The liability provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 to which he refers225 all embody, in effect, neg-
ligence standards of liability226 with no substantially greater proce-
dural requirements. 227 Although section 18 of the Exchange Act 228
contains a good faith defense, that section applies only to documents
filed with the Commission (much of the information in which would
not be material even under the expanded test proposed herein for
80,299,352 shares of TGS stock outstanding on May 6, 1968. 1968 MOODY'S INDUS.
MANUAL 2276.
225 401 F.2d at 867.
22 See §§ 11, 12 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77K, 77L and
77q. A standard of reasonable care has been applied in actions based on Section
17(a)(2), from which the language of Rule lOb-5(b) is taken, in both civil cases, e.g.,
First Trust & Savings Bank of Zanesville, Ohio v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.,
112 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 848 U.S.
856 (1954); Dack v. Shannon, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see S.E.C. v. VanHorn,
371 F.2d 181, 184-86 (7th Cir. 1966); but see, Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416,
419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); and criminal proceedings, e.g., Greenhill v. United States, 298
F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830; 372 U.S. 968, rehearing denied,
373 U.S. 947 (1963); see United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1962).
227 The 1933 Act provisions all have a one-year statute of limitations, apply only
to sellers or offerors of securities and require proof of reliance. Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, of course, did not expressly provide a private right of action and
contains no statute of limitations but the materiality, reliance and "in connection with"
requirements in Rule 10b-5 actions are ample restrictions on plaintiffs and the absence
of a statute of limitations seems insignificant if, as suggested in note 215, supra, a
plaintiff may not recover damages resulting from a windfall subsequent to his trans.
action.
228 15 U.S.C. § 78r.
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Rule 1Ob-5 cases) rather than transmitted directly to the public
which require considerably greater protection.229 Moreover, a more
apt analogy may be found in section 20(a) of the Exchange Act pur-
suant to which the liability of controlling persons is not subject to
a good faith defense if they indirectly induced the transactions of
their agents albeit without knowledge of the wrong.23 0 In any event,
however, Rule 1Ob-5 was fashioned by the Commission on section
17 of the 1983 Act, and not on any provision of the Exchange Act,
in order to apply penalties to buyers as well as sellers231 and should
be read to adopt its standard of due diligence.232 Finally, absent any
legitimate concern for the imposition of excessive damages on cor-
porate issuers, 233 there is no reason to apply a less rigorous standard
of care to corporate draftsmen of false and misleading statements
than to insiders or tippees who are held to a standard of reasonable
care, 23 4 especially since the former are more likely to be financially
responsible to compensate injured investors,ms or to be insured for
negligent conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
While the holding of Texas Gulf should have caused no great sur-
prise and did not greatly depart from prior authority, the court's au-
thoritative and extensive discussion of the policies underlying Rule
lOb-5 has had the desirable effect of stimulating greater awareness by
the investment community of the many problems inherent in a se-
curities market which thrives on material corporate information. The
foregoing discussion has sought to explore the far-reaching impli-
229 For example, the proxy material required to be fied under Section 14, 15
U.S.C. § 78m, is reviewed by the Commission before being transmitted to shareholders.
The periodic reports required to be filed on Forms 8-K and 10K do, of course, reflect
material developments previously disclosed to the public and, to the extent that Section
18 adopts a lesser standard of care than that proposed herein under Rule lOb-5, one
can only observe that Congress probably did not conceive of the necessity for a private
right of action in the Section 10(b) context. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule
10b-5, Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw. U.L. R v. 627, 648-60 (1964);
Comment, supra note 219, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rv. at 542. Thus, as in other areas of inter-
preting the Rule, we must proceed on the basis of what Congress would have intended
rather than what was then, in fact, conceived.
230 See Myzel v. Fields, supra, note 223 at 738-39.
231 401 F.2d at 855 n.22.
232 See authorities cited in note 226, supra.
233 See text accompanying notes 221-24, supra.
234 See 401 F.2d at 854-56, citing, inter alia, Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th
Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
235 See note 224, supra, and accompanying text.
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cations of Judge Waterman's landmark opinion and in light of these
policies to suggest resolutions of issues not squarely presented in
Texas Gulf.
Unquestionably, many problems await consideration, hopefully
by the Commission after full utilization of the administrative process,
and many of the solutions suggested herein will require legislative
and/or administrative implementation, as well as judicial refinement.
As a first step in this inevitable direction, it would be most helpful
for the Commission to establish a special office to provide immediate,
firm230 advice to troubled insiders concerning materiality and time-
liness of transactions and to corporations concerning the timing and
form of disclosure.237 Such a procedure could, at the very least, mini-
mize the losses of ethical insiders without recourse to a minimum
"waiting period" which would necessarily permit outsiders to act
before insiders. In addition, the grave and legitimate liability fears of
corporate management would be greatly alleviated by provision of,
in effect, free liability insurance.
Finally, in this regard, the Commission should increase its police
force. At the outset, increased enforcement should be directed to
brokers and dealers who are the primary carriers of rumors and tips.
Underwriting firms and banks, as well as financial publishers, should
be required to institute internal security measures designed to segre-
gate and identify material undisclosed information, and control its
use in much the same way that the government treats classified in-
formation.238 Similarly, public corporations and the foregoing mem-
bers of the investment community should undertake to educate their
employees in order to enable them to recognize and deal with ma-
terial undisclosed information. And, to the extent that the N.A.S.D.
is incapable of operating an effective "stock-watch" program for over-
the-counter securities, where the dangers of insider abuse are partic-
ularly great, the Commission should also actively supplement or
effectuate this task.239
236 Such advice could take the form of an expedited "no action" letter confirming
a determination on a given set of facts recorded from telephone inquiries; this advice
should, of course, be persuasive (unless Commission revision of Rule lOb-5 renders
it binding) on the facts given in private actions.
237 Cf. Comment, supra note 219, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. at 561, generally suggesting
the adoption of a Rule lOb-5 advisory procedure.
238 See, e.g., the system adopted by Merrill Lynch, described in note 162, supra.
239 The Commission operates a partial "stock-watch" in over-the-counter secu-
rities but, because of the inaccessibility of trading volume data, this program is limited
to price changes and changes in participating dealers. While significant volume changes
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These measures are obviously expensive. Rather than funding
them from general revenues it may be preferable to impose an ad-
ditional securities transfer tax or to exact monetary penalties for cul-
pable violations of the Rule which are payable ultimately to the Com-
mission. Another possibility would be to utilize the disgorged insider
profits which the Commission hopes to obtain in cases like Texas
Gulf to defray its operating expenses. This seems more sensible than
holding such profits for the accounts of unidentified potential plain-
tiffs or rewarding the few whose transactions can be matched with
those of insiders. In addition, the probability that the only parties in-
jured as a result of insider trading, as distinguished from false, mis-
leading or non-disclosure, will be unable to demonstrate any sub-
stantial loss would indicate that few of them would ever become
active plaintiffs, except insofar as class actions under Rule lOb-5 are
permitted to promote the barretry practiced in section 16 actions.2 40
If these or other more appropriate measures are forthcoming,
honest markets and a healthy investment community can indeed
coexist.
are more likely to result in price changes in unlisted than in listed securities, the two
do not always vary directly. Thus, at least for the purpose of facilitating early detection
of possible insider activity, volume information should be supplied by market-makers
to the Commission or the N.AS.D. (whichever is to maintain a "stock-watch"), if not
to the public. See note 151, supra.
240 See, e.g., Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.
N.Y. 1948).
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